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In June 2013, in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 7	  
(Myriad), the Supreme Court answered the provocative question, “Are human genes 8	  
patentable?” with an equivocal, “Probably not.”1 Since then, a lot of ink has been spilled 9	  
speculating on the impact of the decision, yet many questions remain unanswered for 10	  
biotechnology companies, genetic researchers, and healthcare providers who must 11	  
navigate its legal aftermath—what influence will Myriad have over the patent subject 12	  
matter eligibility doctrine,2 how will Myriad impact investment decisions within the 13	  
biotechnology industry,3 will Myriad Genetics, Inc.’s (Myriad) remaining patents and 14	  
proprietary data successfully keep competitors at bay,4 and how might personalized 15	  
cancer care change as a result?5 Although these questions are important, this Article 16	  
doesn’t promise to answer them. Instead, it presents the Myriad saga as a cautionary 17	  
patent tale, one that explores a more fundamental question—how can patent law, in the 18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Associate Professor of Law, S. J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I am grateful to Teneille 
Brown, Dan Burk, Jorge Contreras, Lincoln Davies, Leslie Francis, Andy Hessick, Carissa Hessick, Leslie 
Francis, Marc Rinehart, participants in the 2014 Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars conference, and 
participants in the present symposium, The Meaning of Myriad, for their helpful comments. Many thanks 
also to Danny Barber and Angela Silvers for their exemplary research assistance. Any errors are my own.   
1 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) [hereinafter 
Myriad]. The Court held that isolated gene sequences are not patent eligible, even when removed from the 
body, but cDNA sequences, which are ostensibly man-made, are eligible for patenting. Id. 
2 See, e.g., Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic Semicommons, __ U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, __ U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015). 
3 One early account indicates minimal impact on biotechnology investment overall, in light of technological 
advancements. See Howard Wolinsky, Gene Patents And Capital Investment, 14 EUR. MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 871 (2013).  
4 Soon after the Court’s decision, Myriad filed suit against new entrants, some of which sued Myriad for 
declaratory relief in other jurisdictions. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these in 
the District of Utah. Order Granting Motion to Transfer and Consolidate, In Re BRCA1 and BRCA2-Based 
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., MDL Case No. 2:14-MD-2510 (D. Utah July 7, 2014). Myriad is the 
co-owner or exclusive licensee of the patents in both Myriad and the newer litigations, and Myriad 
commercialized the diagnostic tests at issue in Myriad. This Article refers to Myriad as the patent owner, 
and this designation indicates its ability to control the patent rights to exclude others including other joint 
owners. See Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccancia Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875−76 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (holding that an exclusive licensee possesses all of the substantial rights in a patent). 
5 Kenneth Offit et al., Gene Patents and Personalized Cancer Care: Impact of the Myriad Case on Clinical 
Oncology, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2743, 2743 (2013) (suggesting that Myriad “will likely not have a 
large immediate impact of oncologic care patients . . . [but] may have a larger long-term impact on the role 
of intellectual property protection in modern genomic and medical science.”). 
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words of Benjamin Cardozo, “mediate between the conflicting claims of stability and 19	  
progress?”6  20	  
The Myriad story began long before the Myriad plaintiffs filed suit in 2009,7 and 21	  
even before Myriad and others raced to discover the genes linked to hereditary breast 22	  
cancer in 1994.8 In 1980, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty confirmed the 23	  
patent eligibility of biological organisms.9 In doing so, the Court welcomed an exciting 24	  
new field of biotechnology to play by the existing patent rules. As Myriad won the race 25	  
to isolate and sequence the breast cancer genes, obtained patent protection over them, 26	  
enforced its patents against others, built and monopolized a market for diagnostic tests, 27	  
and, finally, defended its patents against challenges, it did so within, not outside of, the 28	  
confines of patent law. The commercialization of breast cancer diagnostic testing, 29	  
chronicled from Chakrabarty to Myriad, demonstrates how stability within patent law’s 30	  
eligibility doctrine, a limited ability to challenge gene patents despite vocal critics, and 31	  
the strength of gene patents to exclude others within markets like those for diagnostic 32	  
testing converged to slow progress within the law. This resulted in a commercial 33	  
monopoly based upon later-invalidated patents and unintended consequences for all 34	  
stakeholders.  35	  
This Article explores the Myriad case as an illustration of patent law’s 36	  
unremitting struggle to mediate between stability and progress. Part I describes the 37	  
scientific and commercialization background necessary for understanding the Myriad 38	  
litigation. Part II examines the patent eligibility doctrine through the lens of Myriad and 39	  
the doctrine of standing as it related to the Myriad plaintiffs. It also discusses how its 40	  
patents enabled Myriad to monopolize the market for commercial breast cancer 41	  
diagnostic testing in the United States and the consequences (perceived and real) for 42	  
genetic researchers, healthcare professionals, and their patients. Part III tells the Myriad 43	  
story as one of slow progress in the law with many important and lasting effects. It offers 44	  
several suggestions that might mitigate the mistake of relying too heavily on patent law 45	  
stability at the cost of progress of both law and technology, especially in light of ever-46	  
changing social, scientific, and economic realities, as demonstrated in Myriad itself. 47	  
I. FROM MANDEL TO MYRIAD GENETICS 48	  
In a May 14, 2013, op-ed in the New York Times, Angelina Jolie, the actress and 49	  
humanitarian, announced that she had undergone a preventive double mastectomy after 50	  
testing positive for BRCA1, a gene linked to an exceedingly high risk of breast and 51	  
ovarian cancer.10 Discussing the diagnostic testing that she received, Jolie wrote:  52	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1 (1924). Cardozo, of course, referred to progress in the 
law, not progress of technology, as the patent system is meant to promote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
This Article discusses progress along both dimensions, and often refers to growth in the law to indicate 
legal progress, as compared to technological progress. 
7 Complaint, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-
4515). 
8 See Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate For The Breast And Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene 
BRCA1, 266 SCIENCE 66 (1994); Richard Wooster et al., Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptibility 
Gene BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789 (1995). 
9 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
10 Angelina Jolie, Op-Ed., My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A25. 
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Breast cancer alone kills some 458,000 people each year . . . 53	  
mainly in low- and middle-income countries. It has got to be a priority to 54	  
ensure that more women can access gene testing and lifesaving preventive 55	  
treatment, whatever their means and background, wherever they live. The 56	  
cost of testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, at more than $3,000 in the United 57	  
States, remains an obstacle for many women.11  58	  
Jolie didn’t identify the provider of her diagnostic test, nor did she weigh in on the merits 59	  
of gene patenting—her message encouraged women to gather information, learn more 60	  
about incidences within a patient’s own family, and, when appropriate, get testing for the 61	  
individual patient.12 Nevertheless, as shown by the tremendous public interest taken in 62	  
Jolie’s story,13 breast cancer is an important and all too common disease among women. 63	  
As described below, the disease’s significance blazed a path from early scientific 64	  
breakthroughs to commercial diagnostic tests like Jolie used, which set the stage for the 65	  
Myriad litigation.  66	  
A. A Brief History of Genes and Gene Hunting 67	  
The twentieth century featured huge advances in the science of heredity beyond 68	  
the basic theory of inheritance first proposed by Gregor Mendel in 1865.14 At the turn of 69	  
the century, the word “gene” first described an abstract idea, a basic unit of heredity that 70	  
passed traits from parent to child—what early scientists believed to be “an inherently 71	  
stable, potentially immortal, unit that could be transferred intact through the 72	  
generations.”15 This old-fashioned notion gave way to the discovery that a gene is a 73	  
physical thing on a chromosome16 (“like beads on a string”17), which, in turn, gave way 74	  
to a series of extraordinary discoveries that unraveled the concept of a gene as a linear, 75	  
contiguous thing—genes are sequences of nucleotides (more familiarly, deoxyribonucleic 76	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Emily Wax, ‘I Have the Angie Gene’: Fostering a Sisterhood, WASH. POST, July 12, 2013, at 
C1, C7; Delthia Ricks, BRCA gene mutations more common than once thought, NEWSDAY (July 8, 2013, 
12:13 AM), http://www.newsday.com/news/health/brca-gene-mutations-more-common-than-once-though-
1.5641518; Jillian Berman, Angelina Jolie Op-Ed May Fuel ‘Epidemic’ of Women Asking for Double 
Mastectomy, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2013, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/angelina-jolie-oped_n_3275208.html. 
14  GREGOR MENDEL, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDIZATION (1865). TED EVERSON, THE GENE: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 44 (2007). Mendel, an Augustinian friar, labored on his hybridization 
experiments for years “alone, and unheeded, broken off from the rest.” WILLIAM BATESON, MENDEL’S 
PRINCIPLES OF HEREDITY: A DEFENCE (1902). Later, in 1900, a group of scientists “rediscovered” 
Mendel’s paper to support their own research relating to heredity. EVERSON, supra at 44.  
15 Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 157, 
163 (2010). Torrance recounts the naming of the hereditary unit as a gene, and describes the complexity of 
the gene concept—something far beyond a simple unit of heredity, as originally proposed—and argues that 
gene talk, how the biology community explain genes, resulted in “acceptance by the patent system of a 
gene concept that is inaccurately simplified and predictable.” Id. at 187. 
16 Ingrid Lobo & Kenna Shaw, Thomas Hunt Morgan, Genetic Recombination, and Gene Mapping, 
SCITABLE (2008), http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/thomas-hunt-morgan-genetic-recombination-
and-gene-496. 
17 Torrance, supra note 15, at 164 (quoting THOMAS HUNT MORGAN, THE THEORY OF THE GENE 24 
(1926)). 
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acid or DNA) built into a double-helical structure,18 DNA instructs cells to make proteins 77	  
and regulates cell activity, and DNA has both exons (active portions carrying 78	  
instructions) and introns (inactive portions that maybe do something else or maybe 79	  
nothing).19 Geneticists have found “overlapping genes, genes within genes and countless 80	  
other weird arrangements.”20  81	  
As scientists worked to understand the gene and its intricate work within a human 82	  
cell, new technologies emerged that enabled researchers more easily to hunt for genes on 83	  
human chromosomes. Genes linked to inheritable diseases especially held great promise 84	  
for diagnostic testing, therapeutic products, and preventative measures.21 In the 1960s and 85	  
1970s, researchers discovered practical ways to use genetic markers (short genetic 86	  
sequences at known locations on the chromosomes) to locate specific genes of interest—87	  
as markers were identified across chromosome regions, inheritance of both a trait and its 88	  
marker signaled linkage to the marked gene. 22 The resulting genetic linkage maps 89	  
brought studies of inherited traits within families and molecular biology together.23 After 90	  
a gene hunter located a gene in a specific region within a chromosome using markers, she 91	  
could then build physical maps of DNA sequences between the markers that revealed the 92	  
specific DNA sequence of the gene in question.24 Prominent single-gene hereditary 93	  
diseases first linked to specific genes during this timeframe using these or similar 94	  
techniques included sickle cell anemia, Huntington’s disease, Duchenne muscular 95	  
dystrophy, and cystic fibrosis.25 Despite occasional breakthroughs, locating, isolating, 96	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 James Watson & Francis Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). 
Obviously, molecular biology and genetic sequencing are highly complex areas of study and this Article 
does not delve deeply into the specific science and technology involved. For a more detailed explanation 
related to these topics in the context of Myriad’s patents, see Judge Sweet’s discussion in Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 193−200 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the citations therein. 
19 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194; see also Helen Pearson, What is a Gene?, 
441 NATURE 399, 399 (2006) (“The more expert scientists become in molecular genetics, the less easy it is 
to be sure about what, if anything, a gene actually is.”). Scientists often use the term “junk DNA” to refer to 
an inactive DNA sequence that does not encode a protein, or more broadly, to refer to any DNA sequence 
that “does not play a functional role in development, physiology, or some other organism-level capacity.” 
Alexander F. Palazzo & T. Ryan Gregory, The Case for Junk DNA, 10 PLOS GENETICS 1 (May 2014) 
(concluding that recent research does not support a finding that all DNA is functional). See also Lucas D. 
Ward & Manolis Kellis, Evidence of Abundant Purifying Selection in Humans for Recently Acquired 
Regulatory Functions, 337 SCIENCE 1675 (2012); JONATHAN WELLS, THE MYTH OF JUNK DNA (2011). 
20 Pearson, supra note 19, at 399. 
21 See Allen C. Nunnally, Note, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate Biotechnology in 
the New Genetic Age, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 306, 315 (2002) (describing “prophylactic measures” as “a 
primary goal of genetic testing”); John Bell, Predicting Disease Using Genomics, 429 NATURE 453, 453 
(2004) (“Prediction, prevention and counselling of individuals at risk of genetic diseases have been aimed 
largely at single-gene disorders that have mendelian patterns of inheritance.”). 
22 U.S. CONGR. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-373, MAPPING OUR GENES—THE GENOME 
PROJECTS: HOW BIG, HOW FAST? 4–6 (1988). 
23 ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME 29–47 (1994) 
[hereinafter COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS]; Robert Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human Genome, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 579 (1991) [hereinafter Cook-Deegan, Mapping]. 
24 See Cook-Deegan, Mapping, at 581–582.; U.S. CONG, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 22, at 
26–28. 
25  KEVIN DAVIES & MICHAEL WHITE, BREAKTHROUGH: THE QUEST TO ISOLATE THE GENE FOR 
HEREDITARY BREAST CANCER 251 (1995). 
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and sequencing genes associated with particular proteins or diseases proved difficult.26 97	  
Better markers, known as restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs),27 offered 98	  
improvements, but the basic process remained tedious and repetitive: locate a 99	  
chromosomal region using family studies, “pull out the genes in the . . . region and screen 100	  
them for mutations.”28  101	  
The hunt for a gene linked to hereditary breast cancer proved no different, but 102	  
captured the imagination of many vying to find it, as well as the popular press.29 Breast 103	  
cancer, like other cancers, derives from a large number of factors, including genetic and 104	  
environmental ones.30 However, researchers as early as the 1800s noted that some forms 105	  
of breast cancer appeared to have higher incidences within families.31 By the late 1980s, 106	  
several groups in the United States, England, France, Germany, Japan, and other 107	  
countries were working to find the genetic basis for hereditary breast and ovarian 108	  
cancer.32 In 1990, Mary-Claire King announced that her team at the University of 109	  
California, Berkeley, had localized the first gene associated with increased risk for breast 110	  
cancer, known as BRCA1, to a region of chromosome 17.33 Researchers around the world 111	  
then used every available technology to dissect and scrutinize this genomic region as they 112	  
raced to isolate and sequence BRCA1.34 Myriad won the “most impassioned and publicly 113	  
visible of all genetic races” when it announced on September 15, 1994, that the company 114	  
had isolated and sequenced BRCA1.36  115	  
Following the discovery of BRCA1, researchers at Myriad and elsewhere 116	  
continued to hunt for a second gene using similar approaches.37 In late December 1995, 117	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 114–15 
(2001) (explaining the historical difficulties with gene sequencing encountered by the biotechnology 
industry).  
27 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 131–33; COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS, supra note 23, at 40–44. 
28 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 266. See Declaration of Sir John E. Sulston, Ph.D. at 5–8, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515). 
29 Natalie Angier, Fierce Competition Marked Fervid Race for Cancer Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, 
at C1. 
30  DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 50; see Bernadine Healy, BRCA Genes — Bookmaking, 
Fortunetelling, and Medical Care, 336 New Engl. J. Med. 1448–1449 (1997). 
31 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 120 (describing French surgeon Pierre Paul Broca as the “first to 
notice the potential significance of the clustering of cancers, notably breast cancer, within a single family”).  
32 See Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of 
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 131 (2002); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
33 Williams-Jones, supra note 32, at 131 (citing M.-C. King, Localization of the Early-Onset Breast Cancer 
Gene, 26 HOSPITAL PRACTICE 121 (1991)); Jeff M. Hall et al., Linkage of Early-Onset Familial Breast 
Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 SCIENCE 1684, 1684–89 (1990). See also DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 
25, at 1–6.  
34 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201.  
36 Angier, supra note 29 at C1. See also Miki et al., supra note 8; Natalie Angier, Scientists Identify a 
Mutant Gene Tied to Hereditary Breast Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1. As is typical for many 
medical innovations, Myriad did not claim credit singularly. Researchers at Myriad worked with others at 
the University of Utah, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, McGill University, and the 
Eli Lilly and Company to discover the gene. See Miki et al., supra note 8 for a complete listing of 
researchers and their affiliations. 
37 See Declaration of Dr. Sean Tavtigian at 2, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515) [hereinafter Tavtigian Declaration]. 
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Myriad isolated and sequenced BRCA2, a gene previously linked to chromosome 13.38 118	  
After Myriad isolated and sequenced the genes, it sought and obtained a number of 119	  
patents claiming sequences identified with the BRCA genes, in whole or in part, and 120	  
methods for comparing those claimed sequences to the identified BRCA genes to 121	  
determine whether predisposing mutations are present in patients.39 The first patent was 122	  
issued on December 2, 1997; eventually, Myriad would own (or exclusively license) nine 123	  
patents in all covering the BRCA genes.40 124	  
B. Myriad Genetics and BRCA Diagnostic Testing Commercialization 125	  
Myriad’s beginnings as a company were humbler than its declared diagnostic 126	  
testing revenues of $748 million in 2014,41 In the early 1970s, the University of Utah 127	  
hired Mark Skolnick, a young geneticist, to collaborate on its grant proposals for a new 128	  
cancer center.42 Skolnick began developing what became the key to Myriad’s later 129	  
success: a database of medical, demographic, and ancestral information collected from 130	  
large Utah families.43 To look for evidence of a genetic predisposition to cancer of any 131	  
kind, Skolnick and his group linked family pedigrees recorded by the Utah Genealogical 132	  
Society to the Utah Cancer Registry, which included records for all cancer cases 133	  
statewide.44  At about the same time, the University of Utah established a cancer 134	  
screening clinic to support Skolnick’s effort.45 This immense amount of data associated 135	  
with Utah families enabled Skolnick to develop an innovative population-based analysis 136	  
of cancer incidence within the family pedigrees.46  137	  
Although technology had advanced such that groups like Skolnick’s could more 138	  
easily sequence DNA, locating and isolating genes continued to be a highly laborious 139	  
process.48 Skolnick and his group found some success studying colon cancer49 and 140	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  See Richard Wooster et al., Localization of a Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene, BRCA2, to 
Chromosome 13q12-13, 265 SCIENCE 2088 (1994). For more information about Myriad’s approach to 
isolating and sequencing the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, see Declaration of Donna Shattuck, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515). 
39 Ass’n  for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2113 (2013). 
40 E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS IN 
MED. S39, at S42 (2010). 
41 Myriad Genetics, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 47 (Aug. 13, 2014). 
42 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 244. 
43  The Utah Population Database, as it’s now known, continues to receive “annual updates from 
contributors for Utah births, marriages, divorces, deaths, cancer records, and driver licenses, as well as 
from Idaho cancer records.” Utah Population Database, UNIV. OF UTAH, 
http://healthcare.utah.edu/huntsmancancerinstitute/research/updb/data (last updated Apr. 8, 2014). 
44 Id. 
45 In the end, “large and genetically informative families . . . and detailed family information, such as 
detailed genealogical records, [were] an important component” to the search for an inherited gene 
implicated in breast and ovarian cancer. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Utah Genealogical Society compiles the extensive genealogy done by the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a valuable resource for researchers looking for this kind of 
familial information. 
46 Declaration of Dr. Mark Skolnick at 3–4, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515) [hereinafter Skolnick Declaration]. 
48 Id. at 4. These early advances featured the use of better markers for a more systematic search for specific 
genes to sequence. Id. 
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continued to work on breast cancer at a slow pace.50 At the same time, the group also 141	  
worked on easier to locate genes like the ones underlying Alport Syndrome, a kidney 142	  
disorder, and neurofibromatosis, a form of cancer.51 Skolnick succeeded in mapping the 143	  
Alport gene in 1988, but lost the race to map the neurofibromatosis gene to Ray White, a 144	  
well-known University of Utah colleague.52 This loss proved to Skolnick that he could 145	  
not compete with bigger groups hunting genes—Skolnick and his group had the skills 146	  
and talent necessary to make important gene discoveries, but they lacked the funding 147	  
required for a search of enigmatic genes like BRCA1 and BRCA2.53  148	  
Skolnick knew that he had something even more valuable than skills and talent—149	  
he had data from the most extensive family studies, thanks to the detailed genealogical 150	  
database incorporating cancer incidences within Utah families.54 To hit the ground 151	  
running, Skolnick took a path often taken by early-stage inventors—he joined forces with 152	  
a venture capital group to create a private company named Myriad Genetics, Inc.55 153	  
Myriad, as a private company, could support Skolnick’s gene hunting research by 154	  
attracting capital from private investors.56 Myriad raised $55 million in this manner in 155	  
1992 alone.57 In August 1992, Eli Lilly and Company, a large pharmaceutical firm, 156	  
contributed $4 million in corporate research funding and purchased $1 million of 157	  
Myriad’s stock.58 Private placement offerings raised an additional $8.8 million in March 158	  
1993 and $59 million in 1994.59 The infusion of cash worked wonders, allowing the 159	  
Myriad team “to work at a superior pace.”60 In September 1994, as a result of intense 160	  
search efforts, the team announced that they had sequenced the BRCA1 gene.61 The 161	  
sequence for BRCA2 came along in much the same way not long after Myriad became a 162	  
public company in 1995.62 163	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Harold M. Schmeck, 50% of Colo-Rectal Cancers Tied to Genetic Predisposition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 
1988, A1; see Lisa A. Cannon-Albright et al., Common Inheritance of Susceptibility to Colonic 
Adenomatous Polyps and Associated Colorectal Cancers, 319 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 533 (1988). 
50 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 195.  
51 Skolnick Declaration, supra note 46, at 4. See also DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 256. 
52 DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 256–57. 
53 Skolnick Declaration, supra note 46, at 5. 
54 Id. at 4–5; DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 261; Gold & Carbone, supra note 40, at S40. As Gold and 
Carbone note, control of the Utah family database remained (and remains still) with the University of Utah, 
but “Skolnick was best positioned to use it, giving Myriad the inside track in the race to sequence BRCA1.” 
Id. at S41. 
55 Williams-Jones, supra note 32, at 129. One of Skolnick’s partners was Walter Gilbert, the 1980 Nobel 
Laureate in Chemistry. Id. 
56 Skolnick Declaration, supra, note 46, at 5.  
57 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
58 See Skolnick Declaration, supra note 46, at 5–6. Eli Lilly obtained the rights to future therapeutics 
related to BRCA1, which it believed would lead to future blockbuster drugs. See Gold & Carbone, supra 
note 40, at S40; see also William-Jones, supra note 32, at 129. Myriad retained the rights for development 
of BRCA2 therapeutics. See id. 
59 See Skolnick Declaration, supra note 46, at 5–6; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 
2d at 201. 
60 See Skolnick Declaration, supra note 46, at 6–7.  
61 See Angier, supra note 29. Roger Wiseman, one Myriad collaborator, stated, “What do I attribute our 
success to? . . . [l]uck.” Id.  
62 See Tavtigian Declaration, supra note 37, at 2 (explaining that U.S. Patent App. Ser. No. 08/576,559, 
filed on December 21, 1995, disclosed the full sequence of the BRCA2 cDNA and protein). Myriad’s initial 
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The discovery of a gene linked to a disease, like the BRCA genes, facilitates 164	  
development of predictive or pre-symptomatic diagnostic tests—tests that give a genomic 165	  
diagnosis based on “deciphering the genes of a patient instead of diagnosing the patient 166	  
based on signs and symptoms.”63 A genomic diagnosis, in turn, facilitates “personalized 167	  
medicine”—a brave new world of drug development for individual patients.64 The 168	  
researchers on the hunt for the BRCA genes recognized the commercial opportunities for 169	  
diagnostic testing and subsequent research and development of gene therapies.65 Myriad, 170	  
under the leadership of Skolnick, an “astute businessman,” was “intent on being the first 171	  
to exploit the commercial potential of the breakthrough when it came.”66 The first 172	  
commercial product for a company like Myriad had to be a diagnostic test to detect 173	  
BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations. Myriad moved quickly to develop one after discovering 174	  
the genes and securing all patent rights (through exclusive licenses from other joint 175	  
owners).67 176	  
Myriad’s flagship diagnostic test, marketed under the name BRACAnalysis®, 177	  
came onto the market in 1996. Currently, a physician must order the test so that the 178	  
patient receives the physician’s interpretation of the results as well as genetic counseling 179	  
and support. 68 BRACAnalysis® originally included only full sequencing of the patient’s 180	  
BRCA genes, 69  but later added detection of large rearrangements. 70  At present, 181	  
BRACAnalysis® costs about $3,340 for the full sequence (and about $475 for testing of 182	  
family members when a relative has already tested positive for one specific 183	  
rearrangement or mutation).71 BRACAnalysis® accounted for $400 million, or 80% of 184	  
Myriad’s revenues in 2011.72 Myriad also offers cheaper tests for single mutations and a 185	  
$700 test for many major rearrangements, marketed under the name BART®—these 186	  
account for most of the remainder of Myriad’s revenues.73  187	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
public offering was held on October 6, 1995. See Myriad Genetics Inc. – Offers Common for Initial Public 
Sale – NASDAQ Symbol, STANDARD & POOR’S DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR 
571993. 
63 George Annas, Genetic Prophecy and Genetic Privacy, 32 TRIAL 18, 20 (1996). 
64 The term “personalized medicine” describes healthcare based on the individual patient’s genetic risks and 
drug sensitivities. See Nancy Shute, Personalized Medicine, 306 SCI. AM. 44 (2012). For more information 
about the history of the Human Genome Project and the future of personalized medicine, see FRANCIS S. 
COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE REVOLUTION IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (2010). 
65 See Gold & Carbone, supra note 40, at S44. 
66 See DAVIES & WHITE, supra note 25, at 222.  
67 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
68 See Williams-Jones, supra note 32, at 133. Myriad initially sold BRACAnalysis® to the public for $900 
as a direct-to-consumer product. However, concerns regarding inadequate genetic counseling support for 
customers and potential liability exposure forced Myriad to recall the test from the market. Id.  
69 See Declaration of Dr. Gregory Critchfield at 20–21, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (No. 09-4515) [hereinafter Critchfield Declaration]. 
70 See id. at 23–24. 
71  Advanced Beneficiary Notice of Non-Care, Myriad Genetics, Inc., available at 
http://www.myriad.com/lib/abn/Myriad-ABN.pdf.  
72 See A. Lane Baldwin & Robert Cook-Deegan, Constructing Narratives of Heroism and Villiany: Case 
Study of Myriad’s BRACAnalysis® Compared to Genetech’s Herceptin®, 5 GENOME MED. 8, 11 (2013) 
(citing Myriad Genetics, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 42 (Aug. 14, 2013). 
73 See Myriad Genetics, Inc., supra note 41, at 42. Because of expenditures in research and development, 
including failed pharmaceutical products, Myriad was not profitable until 2008. See Shuwen Lu, 
Sustainable Development of an Innovative Enterprise in the US Biopharmaceutical Industry—A Case 
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Myriad is the only commercial provider of BRCA testing in the United States and 188	  
all of its testing is conducted at its state-of-the-art facility in Salt Lake City, Utah.74 In 189	  
January 1996, OncorMed, Inc., the owner of a competing patent on a BRCA1 sequence, 190	  
began selling a diagnostic test for BRCA1.75 Later, other laboratories began performing 191	  
diagnostic testing for BRCA genes, including Genetics & IVF Institute (GIVF), the 192	  
University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory (GDL), and the Yale DNA 193	  
Diagnostics Laboratory (YDL).76 In 1998, after patents issued with broad claims covering 194	  
the isolated BRCA sequences, Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to GDL, GIVF, YDL, 195	  
and several researchers who used the services of the GDL. These letters notified the 196	  
recipients of Myriad’s patents and offered a commercial testing license. 77  GIVF 197	  
acquiesced to Myriad’s demand, but GDL continued to provide diagnostic testing, 198	  
claiming a research exemption.78 In 1997 and 1998, Myriad sued OncorMed for patent 199	  
infringement, eventually obtaining its patents in a settlement.79 Myriad also sued the 200	  
University of Pennsylvania for infringement, but the case was later dismissed without 201	  
prejudice after the university agreed to discontinue its BRCA diagnostic testing.80  202	  
Myriad’s business model leaned on its patents in the beginning, but its role as the 203	  
single provider of BRCA diagnostic tests in the United States enables it to collect 204	  
valuable information about the mutations found in its patients’ genes. In addition to 205	  
deleterious mutations (indicating the patient has an identifiable increased risk of cancer) 206	  
or neutral ones (indicating the patient has roughly the same risk as someone with a 207	  
normal version of the gene), BRACAnalysis® might detect a mutation known as a 208	  
“genetic variant of uncertain significance,” or a “VUS,”82  which presents an unknown 209	  
cancer risk.83 With data collected from patients, including ethnicity and family pedigrees, 210	  
Myriad built a large, proprietary database of information about the BRCA genes.84 211	  
Myriad initially shared much of this information with public databases; it stopped doing 212	  
so in 2004, and now keeps its data, including algorithms for interpreting VUS effects and 213	  
specific sequences, as trade secrets.85 As a result, one study suggests that Myriad likely 214	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Study of Myriad Genetics, Inc. 22 (Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Mass., Lowell) 
(on file with author). 
74 See Derek So & Yann Joly, Commercial Opportunities and Ethical Pitfalls in Personalized Medicine: A 
Myriad of Reasons to Revisit the Myriad Genetics Saga, 11 CURRENT PHARMACOGENOMICS PERSON. MED. 
98, 100 (2013). Myriad licensed thirteen other laboratories to conduct single mutation testing in the 
relatives of women who had an identified mutation in Myriad’s testing. See Gold & Carbone, supra note 
40, at S42. 
75 See Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services: The 
FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1213–16 (1997). 
76 See id.; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 398 (S.DN.Y. 2009) 
(denying Myriad’s motion to dismiss the case); Gold & Carbone, supra note 40, at S42. 
77 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 378–79; see also So & Joly, supra note 72, at 99. 
78 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 372; see also Julia Carbone et al., DNA Patents 
and Diagnostics: Not a Pretty Picture, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 784, 788 (2010); So & Joly, supra note 72, at 
99–100. 
79 See So & Joly, supra note 72, at 99. 
80 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 379.  
82 Approximately 7% to 15% of women tested for a BRCA gene have a VUS, but most VUS do not 
increase these patients’ risk of cancer. So & Joly, supra note 72, at 103. 
83 See Critchfield Declaration, supra note 67, at 25–28. 
84 See So & Joly, supra note 72, at 104. 
85 See id. 
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will dominate the BRCA diagnostic testing market long after its patents expire (or are 215	  
declared invalid claim by claim).86 Its access to extensive family data, the VUS database, 216	  
an efficient laboratory, a network of health professionals and payers, and countless 217	  
salespeople guarantee that Myriad remains an enduring player in the genetic testing 218	  
market regardless of its patent claims remaining after Myriad.  219	  
II. FROM CHAKRABARTY TO MYRIAD 220	  
Myriad’s domination of the BRCA diagnostic test market caused its litigation to 221	  
attract unusual attention for a patent case—during the Myriad oral arguments in April 222	  
2013, protesters held signs outside the Supreme Court saying, “Your corporate greed is 223	  
killing my friends” and, “My genes are not property.”87 The case was not unusual for a 224	  
patent case in that it involved a narrow question of patent law—whether certain Myriad’s 225	  
claims were patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Section 101).88 This 226	  
narrow question of law masked a couple of underlying questions about the import of the 227	  
case—how did patent claims covering genetic sequences allow one company to 228	  
monopolize a market, and how did the legal mechanisms for obtaining, enforcing, and 229	  
invalidating patents take so long to effect change?  230	  
The Myriad litigation began in 2009, when a group of plaintiffs, supported by the 231	  
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), filed suit against Myriad, as the exclusive 232	  
licensee and co-owner of BRCA patents, as well as the United States Patent & Trademark 233	  
Office (USPTO), and individual directors of the University of Utah Research Foundation 234	  
(UURF), another co-owner of the patents.89 The details of the litigation have been 235	  
extensively reported in the scientific and popular press, as well as in scholarly work.90 236	  
Part II.A uses the case to highlight the tension between stability and growth in the patent 237	  
eligibility doctrine (in other words, how Myriad obtained patents claiming the BRCA 238	  
genes). Part II.B contends that standing, a procedural device, played a role in delaying 239	  
challenges to the patents despite vocal critics from several sectors. Finally, Part II.C 240	  
explains how Myriad used its patents to develop a monopoly and surveys the 241	  
consequences stemming from its patent enforcement.  242	  
A. Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 243	  
It is common knowledge that patent law derives from Congress’ constitutional 244	  
authority “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”91 To that end, 245	  
Congress enacted its first patent laws in 1790.92 The patent system tends to be viewed as 246	  
utilitarian—patents promote technological progress by giving to an inventor the exclusive 247	  
right to his discovery for a limited time.93 This traditional view of patents assumes that 248	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See id. 
87  Bill Mears, Justices at Odds Over Gene Patents, CNN WIRE (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:15 PM EDT), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/15/health/court-genes/. 
88 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
89 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
90 See, e.g., Jake Gipson, Note, Patentable Subject Matter: A Myriad of Problems, 65 ALA. L. REV. 815 
(2014). 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
92 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (1790).  
93 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 7 (2008) 
(“Patent law is thus straightforwardly utilitarian in outlook: we grant patent rights not to reward inventors 
5-Mar-15]  MYRIAD LESSONS LEARNED  11 
 
 
the incentives created by the patent’s exclusive rights (what others have called “the 249	  
prospect of a marketplace reward”94) will encourage inventions and superior innovation, 250	  
two public benefits meant to outweigh the costs of granting exclusive rights 251	  
(administrative costs, the deadweight losses of monopolies, and so on).95 Because this 252	  
commonly accepted rationale for granting patents in the first place implicates incentives 253	  
to would-be inventors—incentives to invent, disclose, commercialize, etc.96—participants 254	  
at every level of the patenting process prefer uniformity and predictability in the law.97 255	  
After all, uncertainty in the law makes for qualms about ex ante investment.98 Yet, even 256	  
patent law must grow and change to accommodate new technology and social and 257	  
economic thought. Myriad illustrates this eternal struggle between certainty and change. 258	  
Compared to the dramatic race to locate and sequence genes related to breast and 259	  
ovarian cancer, the race to patent them was anticlimactic in the wake of Diamond v. 260	  
Chakrabarty, the seminal 1980 case declaring a genetically engineered microorganism 261	  
patent eligible.99 Before Chakrabarty and after, activists protested the patenting of life 262	  
forms and expressed concerns about the privatization of life itself.100 Despite generating 263	  
scholarly, media, and policy discussion, these activists did not successfully change patent 264	  
policy.101 Fifteen years after Myriad filed its first patent applications, the ACLU decided 265	  
to challenge Myriad’s BRCA gene patents.102 The ACLU and its named plaintiffs faced 266	  
an uphill battle—as one ACLU litigator noted, “[A]lmost everyone we talked with said 267	  
we would lose in court.”103 268	  
Why was Myriad perceived as such a loser? The answer lies within the patent 269	  
eligibility doctrine, a feature of U.S. patent law since 1790. The first patent statutes 270	  
allowed for issuance of patents to inventors who “invented or discovered any useful art, 271	  
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known 272	  
or used.”104 Section 101, the present statute, reads similarly: “Whoever invents or 273	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for their achievements, but to stimulate others to seek the same reward—and thereby contribute new 
innovations for the good of society.”). In an insightful book devoted to exploring the broader group of 
intellectual property rights, Robert Merges challenges the utilitarian view of patent rights as inadequate and 
develops some underlying mid-level principles based upon distributive justice. See ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
94 NARD & WAGNER, supra note 93, at 7, 11. 
95 See id. at 11; see also Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 
899 (2010). 
96 See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 63−68 (6th ed. 2013). 
97 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In the area of patents, it is 
especially important that the law remain stable and clear. . .”). 
98 See Brief for Genetech, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) [hereinafter Genetech, Inc. et al. 
Amicus Brief]; see also Sung, Medical Alert: Alarming Challenges Facing Medical Technology 
Innovation, 6. J. BUS. & TECH. L. 35, 38 (2011).  
99 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).  
100 See Shobita Parthasarathy, Breaking the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science 
and Technology Policy Domains, 37 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 359 (2010). 
101 See id. at 364. See also Cardozo Law School Symposium, Patenting People (2006), available at 
http://www.justinhughes.net/patentingpeople/index.html.  
102 See Sandra Park, Gene Patents and the Public Interest, 15 N.C. J. L. TECH. 519, 520 (2014). 
103 Id. at 524. 
104 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (1790). In 1793, Congress amended the statute to grant 
patents for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
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discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 274	  
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 275	  
conditions and requirements of this title.”106 The same statutory language has defined 276	  
patent eligible subject matter for over 220 years, reflecting an eligibility standard that 277	  
courts view as broad, technologically neutral, and unchanging.107 278	  
Based upon case law dating to the nineteenth century,108 the Supreme Court 279	  
decides patent eligibility disputes based upon the four categories enumerated in Section 280	  
101: compositions of matter, manufactures, machines, or processes. The Court also 281	  
describes three categories of inventions that do not merit patenting despite arguably 282	  
falling within the statutory categories: laws or principles of nature (processes), natural or 283	  
physical phenomena (compositions of matter), and abstract ideas (processes)..109  284	  
In patent eligibility cases, the Court appears wary of the danger of unwarranted 285	  
monopolies that might arise from the patent owner’s right to exclude others (commonly 286	  
referred to as a preemption concern).110 As the Court stated in Le Roy v. Tatham, “A 287	  
patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit 288	  
all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by creating 289	  
monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the 290	  
patent laws.”111 The Court, in O’Reilly v. Morse, explained further, “[I]f he can secure the 291	  
exclusive use by his present patent he may vary it with every new discovery and 292	  
development of the science, and need place no description of the new manner, process or 293	  
machinery, upon the records of the patent office.”112 In other words, the discovery of a 294	  
novel scientific principle would not be (and should not be) patentable, even if the statute 295	  
did not explicitly deny patentability to such principles.113 The Court’s ongoing concerns 296	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before. . . .” 
Patent Act of 1793, ch 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (1793). 
106 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
107 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (“[T]he language of 
§ 101 is extremely broad.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such 
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ 
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”). 
108 The contemporaneous cases of Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852) and O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
62 (1853), involved mid-nineteenth century inventions called into question as not patent eligible. Le Roy’s 
claim for a lead pipe manufactured according to a newly discovered quality of lead and Morse’s claim for 
any method or machine using electromagnetic motive power to print at a distance were both found not 
patentable; their ineligibility hinged on the Court’s refusal to allow patent claims solely to newly 
discovered principles or qualities. In both cases, the Court insisted that any newly discovered principle or 
quality, to be patentable, must be applied to a new composition of matter, manufacture, machine, or process 
adequately described in the patent specification. See Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 174−77; O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 105. 
Though the cases might better be described as inadequate written disclosure cases (admonishing the 
inventors in each to better describe what their invention was), the Court’s insistence that patent subject 
matter necessarily excludes natural laws and principles remains relevant in the most modern cases of 
subject matter eligibility.   
109 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293−94 (2012). 
110 See id. 
111 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175. 
112 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
113 Id. at 124−37 (Grier, J., dissenting). Justice Grier, a dissenter in both cases, suggested something 
subtler—that the statute allowed an inventor to claim all applications of the discovered principle as his 
reward for turning the discovery of a scientific principle into a useful art. Id. 
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for unwarranted monopolies and preemption compel its insistence upon the implicit 297	  
judicial exceptions to the statutory language. 114. Thus, the patent eligibility doctrine 298	  
might best be described as an expansive but bounded set—a pragmatic model meant to 299	  
incentivize the application of discoveries to new and useful purposes, rather than the 300	  
scientific discoveries themselves.116 An inventor whose invention lies out of bounds 301	  
obtains no patent, regardless of any extraordinary expense or ingenuity in his 302	  
endeavors.117  303	  
The product of nature exception plays an important role in defining patent eligible 304	  
subject matter in biological inventions because such inventions inherently implicate 305	  
natural products. As the Court remarked in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 306	  
Laboratories, “[A]ll inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply 307	  
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” 118 Section 101 includes new and 308	  
useful compositions of matter, but “[t]he ‘matter’ of which patentable new and useful 309	  
compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing elements and 310	  
materials.”119 That makes it difficult to determine whether a biological composition falls 311	  
within the bounds of patent eligibility, especially as advances in biological engineering 312	  
might lead to blurred lines between products of nature and patent eligible inventions.120  313	  
Moreover, the judicial exceptions define patent eligible subject matter by defining 314	  
what it is not—a pragmatic rule, but hard to pin down.121 Justice Frankfurter presciently 315	  
noted in Funk Brothers:  316	  
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as “the 317	  
work of nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these are vague and 318	  
malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation. 319	  
Everything that happens may be deemed “the work of nature” and any 320	  
patentable composite exemplifies in its properties “the laws of nature.” 321	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“[The Court has] interpreted § 101 and its 
predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years”) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). Le Roy and O’Reilly denied patents to claims 
directed toward a newly discovered scientific principle or what might be called a natural law. See Le Roy, 
55 U.S. at 173; O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. Later cases denied patents to inventors claiming abstract ideas and 
natural or physical phenomena. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (abstract ideas); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (same); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (same); 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (products of nature); Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 
(same). 
 
116 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“[A]pplication[s] of such concepts to a new and useful end, we have 
said, remain eligible for patent protection.”) (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
117 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
118 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). Everything “with 
which man deals and for which patent protection is granted are products of nature in the sense that nature 
provides the basic source materials.” Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th 
Cir. 1958). 
119 Merck, 253 F.2d at 162.  
120 See, e.g., Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA. L. REV. 1137 (2014) 
(developing a test for eligibility based on the scientific philosophy of complexity). 
121 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding claims ineligible by 
characterizing the final product as merely repackaging products of nature). 
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Arguments drawn from such terms for ascertaining patentability would 322	  
fairly be employed to challenge almost every patent.122 323	  
The Court recently explained in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank that the exceptions exist (and 324	  
must exist) because otherwise “‘[m]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a 325	  
patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby 326	  
thwarting the primary object of the patent laws.”123 This worry—inhibiting the future use 327	  
of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work”124 and “building blocks of human 328	  
ingenuity” 125 —ties squarely into the commonly accepted rationale for patents as 329	  
incentives to aspiring inventors. Justice Breyer once described the patent system as “not 330	  
only encourag[ing] research by providing monetary incentives for invention” but also as 331	  
potentially “discourag[ing] research by impeding the free exchange of information.”126 In 332	  
other words, the patent system should be concerned as much with avoiding the dangers of 333	  
overprotection as it is with avoiding the diminished incentives of too little protection.127 334	  
Because stability in the law is paramount to encourage invention and investment, the 335	  
“vague and malleable terms” used to define what is not patent eligible have caused 336	  
mischief, especially in cases where the technology at issue is difficult to characterize.128 337	  
In 1980, the Court stepped into this fray in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.129 No case 338	  
has had more of a lasting impact in the biotechnology field.130 The inventor claimed a 339	  
bacterium modified by the insertion of two or more plasmids into the bacteria cells.131 340	  
The resulting genetically modified organism could break down multiple components of 341	  
crude oil, a property no naturally occurring bacteria possessed—was it patent eligible?132 342	  
The Court first repeated the incentive account of patent law.133 It then moved to Section 343	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Id. at 134–35. 
123 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1923).  
124 Id. (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). 
125 Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (2012)). 
126 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
127 Id.  
128 See id. at 134.  
129 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See Daniel J. Kevles, Ananda Chakrabarty Wins a 
Patent: Biotechnology, Law, & Society, 25 HIST. STUD. PHYS. & BIOL. SCI. 111, 131 (1994); [Cite other 
articles.] 
130 Kevles, supra note 125, at 135. See, e.g., Anna Lumelsky, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Gauging 
Congress's Response to Dynamic Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 
691 (2005) (“[T]he impact of the Chakrabarty holding continues to be extraordinarily broad twenty-five 
years after the decision.); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 
TENN. L. REV. 707, 736 (2004) (“The [Chakrabarty] decision is frequently characterized and cited for its 
effect on opening the gates of the patent system to biotechnology…”). 
131 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. 
132 Id. At first, the USPTO rejected Chakrabarty’s product claims as not eligible for patenting under Section 
101 on two grounds: 1) microorganisms are products of nature; and 2) living things are not eligible for 
patenting under § 101. The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed this rejection on the latter ground, but the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the rejection to allow the claims as eligible subject matter. 
Following the Court’s order vacating and remanding the case for further consideration in light of Parker v. 
Flook (a case involving the abstract ideas exception), the case made its way back to the Supreme Court for 
a final decision on the patent eligibility question. Id. at 306−07. 
133 Id. at 307. The Court noted that “[t]he authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that ‘[t]he 
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new 
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased 
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101 and its enumerated categories, concluding that the statute intended to cover 344	  
expansive ground by “includ[ing] anything under the sun that is made by man.”134 But it 345	  
does not embrace every discovery, excluding “[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, 346	  
and abstract ideas.”135 Based on this restatement of by-then almost 130 years of doctrine, 347	  
the Court held the microorganism patent eligible; it was a “nonnaturally occurring 348	  
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a 349	  
distinctive name, character [and] use.’”136  350	  
The Court did not alter its classic model of Section 101 in light of the “gruesome 351	  
parade of horribles” offered by the USPTO and amici.137 The Court firmly stated that a 352	  
determination of patent eligibility “[would] not deter the scientific mind from probing 353	  
into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides.”138 The Court invited 354	  
gene patent critics to bring their complaints to the executive or legislative branches, and 355	  
insisted that the language of Section 101 “fairly embraces [Chakrabarty’s] invention.”139  356	  
The Chakrabarty case was contentious, but the Court avoided some of the ethical 357	  
and moral questions raised by kicking them over to Congress or the executive branch. It 358	  
embraced a clear vision of patent eligibility for all things made by man and distinctive 359	  
from naturally occurring things.140 That vision signaled to biotechnology companies that 360	  
their research endeavors—including genetically modified products and maybe products 361	  
isolated or purified from naturally occurring states—would not be categorically excluded 362	  
from patenting.141 As one newspaper reported, “The decision opened a floodgate.”142 363	  
Biotechnology companies filed patent applications at a record pace.143  364	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employment and better lives for our citizens.’” Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 480 (1974)). 
134 Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 6 (1952)). 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 309−10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). The Court also rejected the 
USPTO’s argument that microorganisms cannot be patentable until Congress declares them so. In doing so, 
the Court noted, “[t]he subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill 
the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that 
means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not 
necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.” Id. at 315. 
137 Id. at 316. 
138 Id. at 317 (“Whether respondent’s claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are 
accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all.”). 
139 Id. at 318. 
140 Id. at 317–318. The decision was decided by a 5-4 vote, and Justice Brennan wrote a dissent arguing that 
the Patent Plant Act precluded patenting. Id. at 318−19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141 See Thomas A. Hemphill, The Biotechnology Sector and US Gene Patents: Legal Challenges to 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Impact on Basic Research and Development, 39 SCI. & PUB. POLICY 
815, 816 (2012). This signal to investors came along at exactly the right time and in exactly the right place, 
following the emergence of the biotechnology industry in the United States in the late 1970s with 
recombinant human insulin, developed by Genentech, Inc. and Eli Lilly & Co. See id. 
142 Julia Fortier, Biotechnology Faces a Fight Over Patents, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1985, at 25. 
143 Id. 
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The Chakrabarty vision embraced by biotechnology companies underscored the 365	  
role of human intervention in patent eligibility,144 but it did not say anything about the 366	  
eligibility of isolated genomic sequences. 145 Companies isolating them filed patent 367	  
applications, and the USPTO had to make its own post-Chakrabarty determination. 368	  
Based upon its own finding that these gene sequences were compositions of matter 369	  
isolated by man and markedly different from what is found in nature, it granted the first 370	  
patent claiming a new and useful isolated gene sequence in 1982 and thousands 371	  
followed.146 In 1995 and again in 2001, the USPTO reconsidered its policy granting 372	  
claims to isolated genomic sequences but affirmed eligibility (although it did provide 373	  
guidelines for other patentability requirements, like utility). 147 374	  
By this time, the Federal Circuit had come into existence, charged with injecting 375	  
patent law with consistency and uniformity across the country.148 The Federal Circuit 376	  
agreed with the USPTO’s policy, recognized isolated gene sequences as patent eligible 377	  
compositions of matter, but grappled with how other patentability requirements applied to 378	  
nucleotide sequences. For example, the court considered whether an applicant met 35 379	  
U.S.C. § 112’s enablement requirement in Amgen, Inc. v. Chumai Pharmaceutical Co., 380	  
where the patent claimed, “[A]ll possible DNA sequences that . . . encode any 381	  
polypeptide having an amino acid sequence ‘sufficiently duplicative’ of [erythropoietin] 382	  
to possess the property of increasing the production of red blood cells.”149 Without 383	  
questioning eligibility, the Federal Circuit held that the patent’s disclosure failed to 384	  
enable such a broad array of sequences without undue experimentation.150 Likewise, 385	  
Section 101’s utility requirement presented another problem for some gene patents. As 386	  
sequencing grew easier and easier, researchers located more and more sequences they 387	  
hoped to correlate to diseases, but that were not yet connected with any use other than as 388	  
research intermediaries. 151  As researchers filed patent applications on these gene 389	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  Christopher M. Holman, Gene Patents under Fire: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE PATENT LAW: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW ON NEW DEVELOPMENTS 260 
(Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini eds., 2011). 
 
145 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L. 
J. 177, 189 (1987).  
146 U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (filed Apr. 19, 1978) “was the first ‘gene’ patent, claiming genes per se.” 
Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 157, 177 
(2010). 
147 Notice of Hearings and Request for Comments on Issues Relating to Patent Protection for Nucleic Acid 
Sequences, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,223 (Nov. 14, 1995). 
148 Lighting Ballast Control L.L.C. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
149 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
150 Id. at 1214; see also In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding claims to certain DNA 
molecules obvious). 
151 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACADEMIC MED. 1381, 1383 
(2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Gene Patenting Controversy]. Eisenberg describes the NIH’s filing of patent 
applications on the first express sequence tags (ESTs) as “sett[ing] off alarm bells in the scientific 
community, although research scientists had previously expressed little concern about the patenting of 
genes encoding therapeutic proteins,” like the BRCA genes. Id. As Eisenberg notes, the applications filed 
on ESTs “coincided with a broader trend in the biomedical research community to claim intellectual 
property rights in research tools, and to assert these rights against academic researchers.” Id.; see also 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large Scale cDNA 
Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996) (examining ESTs as representative of the 
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fragments, the USPTO clarified its position that such sequences were patent eligible only 390	  
if they demonstrated “specific, substantial, and credible” utility, such as diagnosing or 391	  
treating a particular disease.152 392	  
 Litigants in these cases did not seem to doubt the eligibility of gene sequences 393	  
under Section 101—no case arrived at the Federal Circuit to consider the eligibility of 394	  
isolated gene sequences. In fact, most commentators took as a given that gene patents like 395	  
the ones at issue in Myriad were eligible for patenting. An op-ed in Nature, the 396	  
prestigious scientific journal, declared with respect to gene patenting, “Under present 397	  
law, there is no reason why that should not be done. The question that arises is whether 398	  
the law is sound.”153 One article declared, “It is undisputed that DNA (including genes, 399	  
gene fragments, and their corresponding products) can be patented.”154 Yet another 400	  
sounded regretful, stating, “It is too late to prevent patents on individual genes.”155  401	  
Given law, custom, and history, it makes sense that the ACLU would have been 402	  
pessimistic about its case against Myriad’s BRCA patents. Nevertheless, the ACLU’s 403	  
plaintiffs moved the court for a judgment of invalidity on eligibility grounds.156 The 404	  
plaintiffs argued that Section 101 implicitly excluded isolated gene sequences and cDNA 405	  
because they function identically to the genes found in the body (i.e., they encode the 406	  
same instructions for making the same proteins).157 Of course, Myriad argued the 407	  
opposite, focusing on the expansive nature of Section 101, stating, “[I]t is well-settled 408	  
that isolated or purified products, even if they originated in nature prior to being isolated 409	  
or purified, are patent eligible under Section 101.”158 The isolation or purification of the 410	  
claimed molecules, Myriad argued, created a physically different molecule compared to 411	  
its native counterpart, and could function as “physical probes [and] primers to identify 412	  
mutations and diagnose cancer susceptibility in a patient.”159  413	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
increasing difficulty drawing a line between public research typically given to the public domain and 
private research typically appropriated as intellectual property).  
152 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). The USPTO addressed public 
comments about gene patent eligibility: “If a patent application discloses only nucleic acid molecular 
structure for a newly discovered gene, and no utility for the claimed isolated gene, the claimed invention is 
not patentable. But when the inventor also discloses how to use the purified gene isolated from its natural 
state, the application satisfies the ‘utility’ requirement. That is, where the application discloses a specific, 
substantial, and credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified gene, the isolated and purified gene 
composition may be patentable.” Id. In In Re Fisher, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims to ESTs because 
there was no evidence that the claimed genomic sequences were tied to any specific function. In re Fisher, 
421 F.3d 1365, 1372−74 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
153 Opinion, Genes and Patent Laws, 371 NATURE 270 (1994). 
154 Melissa A. Horn, Note, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the Balance Among 
Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 255 (2002). 
155 Jack Wilson, No Patents for Semantic Information, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 15, 15 (2002). 
156 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 34, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515). 
157 Id.  
158 Myriad Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (1) in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and 
(2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 
F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09-4515). Indeed, Myriad argued that the exception itself was directed to physical and 
natural phenomenon, not natural products. Id. 
159Id. at 32.  
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In a nutshell, the Myriad dispute centered on whether isolated gene sequences, 414	  
including cDNA sequences, fell inside or outside the closed set of patent eligible subject 415	  
matter. Both sides cited Chakrabarty and older cases to support their positions. Was an 416	  
isolated gene sequence a new chemical composition “markedly different” from its 417	  
naturally occurring counterpart or was it a product of nature? To underscore its position, 418	  
Myriad emphasized the long-standing USPTO policy to grant patents with these claims as 419	  
significant to the patent eligibility question.160 Neither party advocated for a change in the 420	  
doctrine, but that the isolated gene sequences should be characterized in a specific way to 421	  
support or deny eligibility.  422	  
The Southern District of New Yorks’s Judge Sweet framed the Myriad inquiry as 423	  
whether “claims directed to isolated DNA containing naturally-occurring sequences fall 424	  
within the products of nature exception to [Section] 101.”161 To answer this question, he 425	  
used the “markedly different” doctrine from earlier cases, including Chakrabarty, and 426	  
held that all of the claims were patent ineligible because genetic sequences of all stripes 427	  
are not “markedly different” from their native DNA sequences.162 In other words, the 428	  
sequences described in the claims could (and did) occur in nature—even if the molecules 429	  
were structurally different, they were informationally similar enough to be considered 430	  
naturally occurring.163  431	  
The breadth of the district court’s opinion surprised even patent law experts.164 432	  
(Even the New York Times reported, “The decision invalidating the gene patents stunned 433	  
many lawyers who follow such issues.”165) Of course, Myriad appealed to the Federal 434	  
Circuit, which reversed the trial court’s decision as to the composition of matter 435	  
claims.166 The majority opinion, written by Judge Lourie, held that both isolated and 436	  
cDNA gene sequences were patent eligible under Section 101, a more predictable 437	  
outcome in light of Chakrabarty.167 Tellingly, however, the panel members were divided 438	  
as to both outcome and reasoning.168 The central dispute among them was whether the act 439	  
of isolating a gene sequence (separating a specific sequence of nucleotides from the rest 440	  
of the chromosome) rendered it sufficiently different from the naturally occurring gene 441	  
that the inventor deserved a patent on the gene sequence itself? Judge Lourie believed 442	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 See id. at 26−30. Myriad also stressed the importance of not retrospectively invalidating almost 3,000 
patents with a judicial ruling when Congress could enact prospective legislation prohibiting these types of 
patent claims. Id. at 29, n.11. Myriad suggested that Congress could enact legislation to prohibit patenting 
of isolated gene sequences if it wanted to do. See id. at 28−29. 
161 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220.  
162 Id. at 229–32. 
163 Id. The court invalidated the method claims because a comparison step—comparing a patient’s DNA 
sequence to a known database of mutations—without any other inventive step or transformation, is simply 
an abstract idea, not patentable. Id. at 236; see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012). 
164 See Andrew Pollack, After Patent on Genes is Rejected, Taking Stock, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2010, at 
B1; see also Timothy Caulfield, Reflections on the Gene Patent War: The Myriad Battle, Sputnik and 
Beyond, 57 CLINICAL CHEM. 977 (2011). One scholar remarked, “‘there isn’t a whole lot of doctrinal 
support’ for considering DNA as information rather than as a chemical.” Pollack, supra, at B2.  
165 Pollack, supra note 160, at B2. 
166 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
167 See id. at 1333−35. 
168 See id. at 1337–48 (Moore, J., concurring in part); id. at 1348–58 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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that isolation created new molecules that are non-naturally occurring and patent eligible 443	  
under Chakrabarty’s “anything under the sun made by man” precedent.169 Judge Moore, 444	  
concurring in part, agreed about eligibility, but couldn’t agree that isolation, alone, 445	  
sufficed to find the claims patent eligible.170 Instead, she deferred to the USPTO’s 446	  
decades-old practice of granting gene patents because the reliance interests of gene patent 447	  
holders advised maintaining eligibility over these claims.171 Judge Bryson, dissenting, 448	  
concluded that isolated gene sequences are not patent eligible.172 Like Judge Sweet in the 449	  
lower court, Bryson would have held that the breaking of chemical bonds to create a 450	  
different structure was not dispositive given that the information—the real value of the 451	  
genes—did not change.173 All three judges held the patent claims relating to cDNA 452	  
sequences patent eligible because, in their view, they fit the Chakrabarty model awarding 453	  
patents to man-made inventions. When making cDNA, a person creates a sequence of 454	  
nucleotides by identifying the native mRNA and reverse transcribing it back into a cDNA 455	  
sequence lacking the introns originally present in the gene in question.174  456	  
 Unlike the startling district court opinion, the Federal Circuit’s opinion drew more 457	  
tempered reactions.175 Despite disagreement among the panel members, their quarrel 458	  
remained rooted in the traditional version of the patent eligibility model used by the 459	  
district court, by the USPTO, and by courts in cases like Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. 460	  
The only difference between the invalidation of all of the claims (Judge Sweet in the 461	  
district court), invalidation of only the isolated gene sequence claims (Judge Bryson in 462	  
dissent in the Federal Circuit), and eligibility of all of the composition of matter claims 463	  
(Judges Lourie and Moore in the Federal Circuit) was how each decision-maker 464	  
characterized the nature of the sequences. Gene sequences represent information—465	  
instructions for building proteins within the cell—but at the same time they are chemical 466	  
compositions—molecules featuring specific structures and functions. If the gene is 467	  
characterized as a chemical composition, the Chakrabarty doctrine predicts eligibility 468	  
because the act of isolation creates a new molecule. If the gene sequence is characterized 469	  
as mere information, the Chakrabarty doctrine predicts ineligibility because the 470	  
information is identical to that found in the in vivo gene sequence. In the Myriad district 471	  
court and appellate decisions, the judges took care to parse Chakrabarty and its 472	  
predecessors to come to a decision after making a characterization, without amending or 473	  
fine-tuning the doctrine at all.  474	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 All also agreed that the diagnostic methods were invalid under Prometheus, and that the therapeutic 
screening methods were valid despite Prometheus. Id. at 1337 (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
170 Id. at 1339 (“I see no reason to deviate from this long-standing flexible approach in this case.”).  
171 Id. at 1347 (“This long-term policy of protecting isolated DNA molecules has resulted in an explosion of 
innovation in the biotechnology industry, an industry, which unlike the financial services industry or even 
the software industry, depends on patents to survive. Holding isolated DNA not patentable would destroy 
long settled industry expectations for no reason other than a gut feeling that DNA is too close to nature to 
be patentable, an arbitrary decision based on a judge-made exception.”). Judge Moore also said that she 
might conclude differently if she were deciding the case on a blank slate. Id. at 1343.  
172 Id. at 1349 (Bryson, J., dissenting).  
173 Id. at 1353. 
174 Id. at 1356. Judge Bryson explained, “The cDNA cannot be isolated from nature, but instead must be 
created in the laboratory. The end product is a human-made invention with distinct structure because the 
introns that are found in the native gene are removed from the cDNA segment.” Id. 
175 See Gipson, supra note 87, at 826 (describing the Federal Circuit opinion as “nothing new in the realm 
of patentable subject matter”). 
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Given the high stakes, Myriad appealed the case to the Supreme Court, and the 475	  
public renewed its interest in the gene patenting debate.176 During oral arguments, the 476	  
Justices actively asked questions and created humorous hypotheticals to help sort out its 477	  
characterization of isolated gene sequences.177 The incentive arguments made on behalf 478	  
of Myriad and other patent owners were not lost amid the moral arguments. This Court, 479	  
in particular, seemed sensitive to the need for exclusive rights in burgeoning 480	  
technologies, like biotech, in order to invent and commercialize where otherwise cost 481	  
would be prohibitive.178  482	  
The Court’s 9–0 opinion held that separating the gene from its surrounding 483	  
genetic material did not constitute an act of invention and that isolated gene sequences 484	  
were products of nature not eligible for patenting.179 The act of isolation might sever 485	  
some covalent bonds to produce a different molecule, but a different structure proved 486	  
irrelevant because the claims themselves were not drawn to a specific molecular 487	  
structure, but to the genetic information itself.180 As understood by Judges Sweet and 488	  
Bryson, characterizing the gene sequences as information rather than molecules predicted 489	  
invalidation under Chakrabarty. The Court further explained that cDNA doesn’t 490	  
necessarily suffer from the same patent eligibility problems as the isolated DNA 491	  
sequences.181 In fact, according to the Court, a lab technician who creates cDNA in a 492	  
laboratory using reverse transcription unquestionably creates something new through her 493	  
handiwork.182 494	  
The opinion from the Court spends a lot of time explaining the science (or 495	  
attempting to), but the legal part is short and to the point. Isolated DNA is out of Section 496	  
101’s bounds, but cDNA is in-bounds.183 Justice Thofamas cites Chakrabarty and Funk 497	  
Brothers and understates the ineligibility of isolated gene sequences to the public as a 498	  
foregone conclusion. Even its treatment of cDNA, which turned on the lab technician’s 499	  
role, looks too tidy, as if to say: a human alters this thing, so it is patent eligible. Looking 500	  
more closely at cDNA, it is hard to identify a guiding principle that reconciles patent 501	  
eligibility for cDNA with ineligibility for isolated gene sequences apart from 502	  
restatements of the doctrine found in cases like Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. In a 503	  
surprising twist unique to patent law, the doctrine’s own stability undermines its 504	  
predictive value when it comes to new technologies that challenge the old boundaries of 505	  
what is a product of nature. 506	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See Mears, supra note 84. 
177 Transcript of Oral Argument, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (No. 12-398). Justice Sotomayor asked whether patenting isolated gene sequences was like 
patenting the eggs, flour, and other naturally-occurring ingredients of chocolate chip cookies. Id. at 35. 
Justice Roberts, who loves a baseball reference, asked explored whether isolating sequences was akin to 
carving a baseball bat out of a tree. Id. at 41. Justice Alito asked about medicinal plants found in the jungle 
where simply chewing on leaves had a therapeutic effect. Id. at 7–8. 
178 Id. at 11.  
179 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
180 Id. at 2118. 
181 Id. at 2119. 
182 Id. 
183 The Court noted in a footnote that some cDNA may be ineligible for patenting when a short fragment or 
some other psuedogene. Id. at 2119, n.8. 
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B. Standing to Sue 507	  
Patent eligible subject matter provided the substantive patent question in Myriad, 508	  
but procedurally the case was a pioneer in a burgeoning field of public interest patent 509	  
litigation.184 As with many cases brought to further the public interest rather than private 510	  
ones, the standing doctrine presented a sizable hurdle for the Myriad plaintiffs to 511	  
overcome to continue to challenge the entrenched law of subject matter eligibility..  512	  
Despite a belief that “the odds were long” on a successful challenge to the BRCA 513	  
patents on patent eligibility grounds,185 the ACLU’s mission to “[ensure] people’s rights 514	  
to bodily integrity, human dignity, and scientific freedom” pushed it to bring the 515	  
litigation anyway.186 It didn’t have much to lose if it was unsuccessful (after all, the 516	  
doctrine appeared entrenched), but it had much to gain—it hoped to revive a serious 517	  
debate about gene patenting and broaden the use of patent law litigation to further the 518	  
public interest.187 Recognizing that Section 101 could be “an important lever to help 519	  
advance the public interest,”188 the ACLU seized upon the breast cancer movement to 520	  
start an important conversation about social justice, innovation, scientific advancement, 521	  
and the public interest in patent law.189 Of course, patent litigation doesn’t lend itself 522	  
obviously to advancing the public interest because it typically involves two competitors, 523	  
one typically accused of patent infringement. The Article III standing doctrine and the 524	  
lack of a statutory right to invalidate patents prevented members of the public from 525	  
bringing challenges.190 It was not surprising when Myriad challenged the plaintiffs’ 526	  
standing to bring the suit in the first place. 527	  
When a declaratory plaintiff files a patent suit before being sued for infringement, 528	  
as in Myriad, that plaintiff must demonstrate Article III standing to sue the patent 529	  
owner. 191  The Myriad plaintiffs included “an assortment of medical organizations, 530	  
researchers, genetic counselors, and patients,”192 all claiming harm from Myriad’s use of 531	  
the patents “to prevent [the] [p]laintiffs from engaging in clinical analysis of the BRCA1 532	  
[and BRCA2 genes], from informing women about testing options other than by Myriad, 533	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 70 (2012); Amelia 
Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361 (2013); Consumer 
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
185 Park, supra note 99, at 524. 
186 Id. at 520. 
187 Id. at 524−25. 
188 Id. at 527. 
189 Id. Maybe this is the most tangible result of Myriad: the number of posts about patent law on 
mainstream public websites like Slate and the Huffington Post. See, e.g., Danny Townsend, Myriad 
Genetics Can’t Patent a Human Gene, SLATE (Apr. 7, 2010, 11:34 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/04/myriad_genetics_cant_patent_a_h
uman_gene.html; Emily Bazelon, Are Your Genes Patented?, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/are_your_genes_patented_the_sup
reme_court_will_decide_if_they_can_be.html; Nancy Stordahl, BRCA1 and BRCA2 Gene Patent Debate 
Reaches the Supreme Court: Why Everyone Should Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-stordahl/brca1-and-brca2-gene-patents_b_3015595.html. 
190 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 70 (2012); Amelia 
Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361 (2013); Consumer 
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
191 U.S. CONST. art. III; La Belle, supra note 190, at 70–71. 
192 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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and from obtaining genetic testing or second opinions,” so the district court had to 534	  
consider whether any one of those plaintiffs alleged an adverse interest to Myriad with 535	  
sufficient immediacy and reality.193 536	  
To answer the question, Judge Sweet focused on the Federal Circuit’s more recent 537	  
jurisprudence governing whether any party has standing to seek declaratory judgments of 538	  
patent invalidity—an “all the circumstances” test requiring “some affirmative act by the 539	  
defendant relating to enforcement of its patent rights,” and that the plaintiff has taken 540	  
some “meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity.”194 Courts often 541	  
refused standing to plaintiffs who failed to specify any affirmative acts directed toward 542	  
them, but Judge Sweet noted that these cases did not “establish a requirement that only 543	  
acts directed towards the plaintiff could be considered for purposes of the standing 544	  
analysis . . . .”195 Myriad’s enforcement activity comprised sending cease-and-desist 545	  
letters and other communications, including licensing offers, to GDL and others shortly 546	  
after the patent issued.196 Myriad also filed two suits, which either settled or were 547	  
dismissed without prejudice.197 The eleven-year-old letters, standing alone, might not 548	  
support standing in a declaratory patent case.198 However, Judge Sweet found that 549	  
Myriad’s conduct led to a general belief that anyone engaging in BRCA diagnostic 550	  
testing risked being sued by Myriad, which supported standing.199  551	  
The second part of the Federal Circuit’s inquiry focuses on the plaintiffs’ conduct 552	  
and asks whether a court’s decision would serve as something more than an advisory 553	  
opinion. 200  Judge Sweet distinguished the Myriad researcher plaintiffs’ outfitted 554	  
laboratories from more speculative plaintiffs—they were “poised to begin BRCA1/2 555	  
testing and that the patents-in-suit present the only obstruction to doing so.”201 The non-556	  
researcher plaintiffs (patients and members of medical organizations) alleged a risk of 557	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
194 Id. at 384–85, 387. The USPTO, a named defendant, argued that the plaintiffs were third parties without 
a legal interest of their own in USPTO policies and procedures, that the plaintiffs’ injuries weren’t traceable 
to the USPTO because the harms were caused by Myriad’s refusal to license the patents freely, and that the 
plaintiffs’ injuries were not redressible by a suit declaring the USPTO policies unconstitutional. Id. at 
384−85. The court dismissed these arguments because the statutory remedial scheme did not divest the 
plaintiffs of their ability to assert constitutional claims alleging constitutional harms. Id. at 385. The 
Supreme Court did not take up the question of standing, so the lower court’s decision with respect to its 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the USPTO and the plaintiffs’ standing to bring them 
remains in effect. 
195 Id. at 387. In fact, such a requirement, Judge Sweet continued, would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s MedImmune opinion, requiring that “all the circumstances” be considered in these cases. Id. at 388. 
196 Id. at 378−79. 
197 Id. at 379.  
198 See Avante Int’l Tech., Inc. v. Hart Intercivic, Inc., No. 08-832, 2009 WL 2431993, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 
31, 2009).  
199 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 390.  
200 Id. at 391. 
201 Id. But cf. Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denying jurisdiction 
to a declaratory plaintiff who practiced the invention within a statutory safe harbor free from infringement 
but intended to expand its operations to infringing activity in the future); Mega Lift Sys., L.L.C. v. MGM 
Well Serv., Inc., No. 6:08 CV 420, 2009 WL 1851919 (E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009) (denying jurisdiction to a 
declaratory plaintiff who intended to produce and offer for sale infringing products because the “complaint 
[was] silent as to any ‘meaningful preparation.’”). 
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committing contributory infringement if the researcher plaintiffs offered infringing 558	  
diagnostic testing services. Therefore, Judge Sweet found standing on behalf of all of the 559	  
plaintiffs.202  560	  
The Federal Circuit agreed in part and affirmed just one plaintiff’s standing to 561	  
sue.203 Only Dr. Harry Ostrer alleged sufficient affirmative enforcement acts by Myriad 562	  
(an offer for a collaborative license, plus Myriad’s other assertions about which Ostrer 563	  
was aware) and, of three researchers who could do so, only he alleged an intention to 564	  
actually and immediately engage in allegedly infringing BRCA-related activities.204 The 565	  
others, found to have standing in the district court, did not qualify under a more rigorous 566	  
examination of the Federal Circuit’s test requiring affirmative acts from the patent owner 567	  
and meaningful preparation by the potential infringer.205  568	  
Until 2007, the Federal Circuit had an exacting test for standing in declaratory 569	  
patent cases: a declaratory plaintiff had standing to sue only if she had a reasonable 570	  
apprehension of an infringement suit from the patent owner.206 Plaintiffs like the ones in 571	  
Myriad probably could not have brought a declaratory suit with stale cease-and-desist 572	  
letters and a vague desire to practice the invention but for the patent-in-suit. 207 573	  
MedImmune abrogated the Federal Circuit’s rule in favor of an all-the-circumstances 574	  
approach, emphasizing the importance of patent challenges as a matter of public 575	  
policy.208 Although MedImmune embraced a more liberal view of standing in declaratory 576	  
patent case, 209  typical declaratory plaintiffs include scorned licensing partners, 577	  
disgruntled licensees, present infringers, or others with more definitive plans for 578	  
infringement. A member of the public seeking to invalidate a patent does not have 579	  
standing to sue for invalidity.210 Up until the Myriad suit was filed, anyone without a 580	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 392. 
203 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1308−09 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
204 Id. at 1319. 
205 Id. The question of standing was not granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. 
206 See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As was the case in Gen-
Probe, the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test was particularly onerous on a licensee in 
good standing who could not bring declaratory suits until he terminated or repudiated the license, even if he 
believed the patent was invalid. This gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune. See 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  
207 Compare Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1346–50 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (declining 
jurisdiction because the declaratory plaintiff only professed plans to engage in the infringing activity), with 
Cat Tech L.L.C. v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming jurisdiction because the 
declaratory plaintiff had taken significant concrete steps to infringe).  
208 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127; see Lear v. Adkins, Inc., 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (stating that 
“enforcing this contractual provision would undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free 
use of ideas in the public domain”); Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(“We have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper that it should not remain in 
the art as a scarecrow.”); Rinehart, supra note 185, at 363; Megan M. La Belle, Standing to Sue in the 
Myriad Genetics Case, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 68, 71 (2011) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s Myriad 
standing decision makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge patents, rather than easier; the goal of 
the Court in MedImmune).  
209 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1318 (applying MedImmune’s all-the-circumstances test 
by using the Lujan test for constitutional standing). 
210 Cf. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (denying 
standing for a taxpayers’ group appeal to the Federal Circuit from a USPTO board decision); Organic Seed 
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reasonable apprehension of suit from Myriad—like most of the researchers, doctors, 581	  
patients, and genetic counselors who brought suit—did not have standing to invalidate the 582	  
patent. Myriad had not spent any appreciable time enforcing its patents in over a 583	  
decade—any potential infringement was too remote and too speculative. Even after 584	  
MedImmune, Judge Sweet’s decision to keep the Myriad case moving by reframing the 585	  
lack of recent enforcement by Myriad as an ongoing threat hanging over the heads of the 586	  
plaintiffs (even non-researchers because they risked contributing to others’ infringement) 587	  
arguably went beyond the Federal Circuit’s post-MedImmune jurisprudence. 211 The 588	  
Federal Circuit narrowed this holding quite a bit, but both courts found standing in a way 589	  
that would not have existed prior to 2006. The Federal Circuit’s decision that Dr. Ostrer 590	  
could sue based on his intention to infringe opens the doctrine to more plaintiffs seeking 591	  
to invalidate patents, but the door is not wide open, as recent Federal Circuit cases 592	  
suggest.212  593	  
In addition to pre-MedImmune standing doctrine, the inner-workings of the 594	  
USPTO also served as a procedural roadblock to refinement of the law. When gene 595	  
patents first began issuing, the USPTO offered only one administrative way to seek 596	  
cancellation of patent claims: a reexamination. 213  This proceeding allowed for 597	  
invalidation of claims “on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications,” not on 598	  
patent eligibility grounds.214 Therefore, for the life of the patents at issue in Myriad, 599	  
litigation was the only way in which a Section 101 eligibility challenge could be made.  600	  
Since then, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) added one procedure 601	  
(post-grant review) and amended an older version of reexamination for third parties (inter 602	  
partes review) to enable patent challenges at the USPTO instead of in federal 603	  
litigation.215 Like a reexamination, an inter partes review allows a third party to seek 604	  
cancellation of “[one] or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised 605	  
under [35 U.S.C. §] 102 (novelty) and [§] 103 (non-obviousness) and only on the basis of 606	  
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”216 A patent eligibility challenge is 607	  
still impossible using this type of proceeding. In contrast, a post-grant review allows for a 608	  
wider range of grounds for challenges, including eligibility, but must be brought within 609	  
the first nine months after the patent issues.217 Both proceedings subject the filer to 610	  
estoppel of any claim that was raised or could have been raised in a future civil litigation 611	  
involving the patent.218 Importantly, in either proceeding, the USPTO uses its own rules 612	  
and procedures for assessing the validity of the claims at issue based upon the allegations 613	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying standing to a group of 
organic seed growers who desired to not infringe the patent). 
211 In fact, Professor Megan La Belle argues that the Federal Circuit’s post-MedImmune cases, including 
Myriad, take a formalistic approach in direct contradistinction to the Court’s guidance provided by 
MedImmune. See La Belle, supra note 203, at 71.  
212 Id. 
213 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).  
214 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (2012). 
215 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (post-grant review).  
216 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). The inter partes review replaced inter partes reexamination, a similarly 
limited proceeding with respect to grounds and prior art.  
217 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012). 
218 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (2012) (post-grant review). 
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of the third party.219 A party seeking to challenge the USPTO’s policies may appeal an 614	  
adverse final decision from the Patent Trials and Appeals Board to the Federal Circuit.220 615	  
However, the Federal Circuit recently held that a consumer interest group, like several of 616	  
the plaintiffs in Myriad, did not have the requisite standing to appeal an adverse decision 617	  
in a reexamination.221  618	  
Thus, USPTO alternatives may present a compounding problem for folks like the 619	  
Myriad plaintiffs who seek to declare a category of inventions ineligible for patenting 620	  
despite the USPTO’s approval. First, not very many parties will be in a position to appeal 621	  
the USPTO’s improvident grant of a patent from an agency proceeding as a matter of bad 622	  
policy—only those third parties who challenge a patent in a review, lose, then appeal. 623	  
Then, individual members of public interest groups may have trouble establishing 624	  
standing to appeal that loss to the Federal Circuit without more than a generalized harm. 625	  
Even after Myriad, standing remains a substantial barrier to bringing challenges to patent 626	  
policies like the USPTO’s interpretation of Section 101. 627	  
C. Evidence of Patent Impact 628	  
The long delay between the USPTO’s initial decision to grant patents claiming 629	  
isolated genes and their subsequent invalidation in Myriad, along with the procedural 630	  
impediments to challenges, produced both positive and negative consequences among 631	  
many stakeholders. Myriad successfully utilized a traditional patent and license strategy 632	  
to develop its diagnostic testing business model within the field of biotechnology, which 633	  
drew two main criticisms: that gene patents slowed innovation related to hereditary 634	  
diseases like breast cancer and limited access to diagnostic testing and other healthcare 635	  
products.222  636	  
With respect innovation impact, Myriad’s opponents alleged that research and 637	  
development, in particular, academic research, slowed down due to the patent rights 638	  
granted to a variety of players “upstream within the R&D pipeline.”223 Stakeholders at 639	  
different levels (clinicians, researchers, patients) worried that gene patents would slow 640	  
research progress, especially work that might “[identify] weaknesses in Myriad’s test or 641	  
[distinguish] the effects of different mutations in the genes on disease severity or 642	  
progression.” 224  Myriad’s initially aggressive enforcement strategy encouraged a 643	  
heightened rhetoric regarding research. After 1998, Myriad did not pursue researchers 644	  
using the patented sequences for non-commercial purposes,225 but its early enforcement 645	  
likely affected day-to-day practices in clinics and laboratories nationwide.226 Research, 646	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012).  
220 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012). 
221 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
222 See Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 383 (2011). 
223 Id. at 383.  
224 Carbone et al., supra note 76, at 785. 
225 So & Joly, supra note 72, at 100 (“Myriad . . . claims not to have pursued any researchers other than 
those from the University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory, which it believed to be using 
the test for commercial purposes.”) 
226 Carbone et al., supra note 76, at 785. To explain its 1998 enforcement strategy against GDL, “Myriad . . 
. defined the University of Pennsylvania's testing as ‘commercial,’ as later defined under the terms of a 
1999 Memorandum of Understanding with the US National Cancer Institute.” Id.  
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university, and private laboratories using the BRCA genes for research did not offer 647	  
diagnostic testing to patients in the United States and, importantly, refused to reveal 648	  
relevant results to people participating in BRCA research studies.227 Myriad also allowed 649	  
basic research on its patented genes, entered into over 100 scientific collaborations, and 650	  
contributed data to public databases until at least 2004.228 Myriad even offered its testing 651	  
to researchers at a discounted rate.229  652	  
The impact of gene patents on innovation remains unclear. 230  Researchers 653	  
studying the impact of gene patents in general reported, “neither anticommons nor 654	  
restrictions on access . . . seriously [limited] academic research—despite the fact that 655	  
these researchers operate in a patent-dense environment, without the benefit of a clear 656	  
research exemption.”231 Patent scholars also conclude there is no evidence to support 657	  
patent problems as a result of human gene patents.232 In the area of diagnostic testing, 658	  
however, Myriad’s exclusivity resulted in some empirical evidence supporting concerns 659	  
about research impact.233 Another study investigating the disease hemochromatosis and 660	  
its linked gene HFE, where one patent owner also controlled the diagnostic testing, 661	  
“demonstrate[d] how a gene patent, when enforced, can serve to stifle or hinder human 662	  
genetics research.” 234  Others reported that, especially within the diagnostic testing 663	  
markets, “university researchers [became] more secretive and less willing to share 664	  
research results or materials.”235 665	  
When it comes the impact of gene patents on clinical availability, evidence is 666	  
more conclusive.236 Myriad, by enforcing its patents, could prevent second opinion 667	  
testing and obstruct access to other types of testing that might be utilized by patients or 668	  
their care providers.237 For example, Genae Girard, one of the Myriad plaintiffs, did not 669	  
receive a desired second opinion after testing positive for a deleterious mutation within 670	  
her BRCA2 gene because Myriad was the only laboratory in the country that could 671	  
provide full sequencing of BRCA2.238 Myriad explains that second opinion testing does 672	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 The Federal Circuit certainly perceived a chilling effect even from the decade-old letters sent to GDL 
and others. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See also 
Carbone et al., supra note 76, at 785−86. “[A]s a result of Myriad’s enforcement actions coupled with 
broad patent claims, its fairly narrow conception of what constituted acceptable research and its failure to 
clearly state that it would not pursue those conducting such research, university and private laboratories 
ceased to offer the test publicly in the United States.” Id. 
228 So & Joly, supra note 74, at 100, 104. Myriad’s president, Greg Critchfield, identified 7,000 scientific 
papers that mention the BRCA genes. Critchfield Declaration, supra note 67, at 30.  
229 Tom Reynolds, NCI-Myriad Agreement Offers BRCA Testing at Reduced Cost, 92 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 596, 596 (2000). 
230 Caulfield, supra note 160, at 978 (describing innovation impact as “a complex and rather muddled 
picture.”) 
231  Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006). 
232 Christopher Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of 
Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 305−06 (2007). 
233 Id. at 299−300. 
234 Robertson, supra note 217, at 384.  
235 Caulfield et al., supra note 226, at 1092. 
236 Robertson, supra note 231, at 385−86. 
237 Id. at 386. 
238 Complaint, supra note 7, at 11. 
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and can occur at its facilities and as verification from other facilities.239 Yet there is still 673	  
limited access to alternative testing techniques. The technology that Myriad uses may not 674	  
detect some mutations, possibly up to twelve percent of large genomic deletions or 675	  
duplications due to a flaw in the testing strategy, yet one more extensive alternative, 676	  
known multiplex ligation-dependent probe amplification, is not routinely offered to 677	  
patients.240 678	  
Price is another sensitive issue with gene patent critics and patients. Less evidence 679	  
exists to demonstrate that gene patents inflate the cost of testing. One extensive study 680	  
comparing Myriad’s diagnostic testing for BRCA genes with colon cancer genes, where 681	  
it faces some competition, reported that BRCA testing by Myriad, despite the lack of 682	  
competition in the United States, was cheaper than its colon cancer testing.241 By 683	  
directing all of the BRCA diagnostic testing into its own laboratory, Myriad may have 684	  
reduced the deadweight loss of its own monopoly by pricing effectively to match demand 685	  
as well as third party payers.243 686	  
Myriad’s role as the single BRCA diagnostic testing provider created another 687	  
unique consequence—its tests became the de facto clinical standard of care for patient 688	  
care providers.244 Myriad describes its own BRACAnalysis® test as “the standard of care 689	  
in identification of individuals with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.”245 This test 690	  
utilizes full sequencing, which as noted earlier, may miss some large rearrangements or 691	  
deletions, an observation confirmed in several studies.246 In response, Myriad developed 692	  
BART® to identify some of these missed rearrangements or deletions when a patient 693	  
tests negative using BRACAnalysis®.247 However, Myriad limits the availability of the 694	  
BART® test to a small fraction of the patients seeking BRCA testing as a concurrent test 695	  
at no additional cost.248 Others may buy BART® for an additional fee of $650.249 By 696	  
controlling the market for genetic testing services, Myriad controls the types of tests 697	  
ordered by doctors for their patients, dictates the specific method of testing for all BRCA 698	  
testing, and limits the extent to which a patient can develop a comprehensive genetic 699	  
profile.250 Professor Eileen Kane describes this as a public health issue, with which patent 700	  
law is “not formally burdened.”251 Notably, patent law allows for third party policing of 701	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Myriad Genetics, Inc., Written Comments on Genetic Diagnostic Testing Study 8−9 (2012). 
240 Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic 
Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 
12 GENETICS MED. S15−S16, S29 (2010). 
241 See id. at S23−24. “[C]ompetition does little to affect price overall.” Robertson, supra note 222, at 387. 
243 Id. at 388.  
244 Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 835, 852 (2008). 
“[Myriad used its patent rights] to set a de facto clinical standard by controlling the repertoire of available 
testing options and limiting compensating alternatives to the dominant models.” Id. (citing Jon F. Merz, 
Disease Gene Patents: Overcoming Unethical Constraints on Clinical Laboratory Medicine, 45 CLINICAL 
CHEMISTRY 324, 326 (1999)). 
245  
246 Declaration of Elizabeth Swisher, M.D., at 9, n.2, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-4515) (describing several noteworthy studies).  
247 Id. at 9.  
248 Id. at 10.  
249 Id.  
250 See id. at 10−12. 
251 Kane, supra note 239, at 852. 
28  MYRIAD LESSONS LEARNED   [5-Mar-15 
	  
 
patent invalidity.252 Patent law does not effectively police patent owner conduct except in 702	  
the extreme cases of antitrust liability.253  703	  
The related claims of reduced innovation due to patent enforcement, lack of 704	  
access for patients to genetic testing, increased prices for tests using patented genes like 705	  
BRCA, and de facto standard setting that limits the types of tests that may be ordered for 706	  
patients make for a compelling story against patenting especially in the case of Myriad.  707	  
However, once the USPTO grants a patent, patent law is indifferent to the effect of any 708	  
reduction on competition. Indeed, patent law presumes that any negative externalities 709	  
resulting from reduced competition are outweighed in all cases by the positive 710	  
consequences resulting from the incentives to innovate provided by the patent to 711	  
inventors. Myriad is a relic from an older time, when a successful diagnostic company 712	  
could revolve around one or a few genes.254 Multiplex tests, which look for many genes 713	  
and proteins, and whole genome sequencing, which is becoming cheaper and cheaper, are 714	  
the new realities for diagnostic companies.255 Post-Myriad, gene patents on isolated 715	  
sequences are invalid. New diagnostic companies escape the heavy royalty burden that 716	  
existed and should be able to offer tests that provide a wide range of sequencing for 717	  
patients.256 Yet, Myriad and other companies continue to enforce their remaining patent 718	  
claims against competitors, so the picture is not as rosy as initially believed until these 719	  
claims are sorted out.257  720	  
The Myriad story is not yet finished. Follow-on patent infringement litigation—721	  
suits filed by Myriad Genetics immediately after the decision from the Supreme Court 722	  
and suits filed by hopeful competitors against them seeking declaratory relief—has been 723	  
consolidated into a multi-district litigation based in the District of Utah.258 In a recent 724	  
decision denying Myriad preliminary injunctive relief, Judge Shelby stated, “the public’s 725	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Invalidation can occur through the courts or with an inter partes or post-grant review procedure at the 
USPTO. See supra pp. 23−24. 
253 The plaintiffs in Myriad did not raise any antitrust claims. However, Ambry Genetics did make 
additional antitrust claims in its current litigation (now consolidated into In Re BRCA). Ambry claimed that 
Myriad brought its July 2013 lawsuit against Ambry in bad faith because Myriad believed that its 
remaining patent claims were invalid after Myriad. Judge Robert Shelby dismissed Ambry’s counterclaims 
in June 2014, agreeing with Myriad that its litigation was not a sham one because Myriad’s patent claims 
were obtained without inequitable conduct and because Myriad left open the possibility that Myriad’s 
remaining claims were valid as directed to more inventive concepts than isolated DNA sequences or 
diagnostic methods invalid after Mayo. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Ambry’s 
Antitrust Counterclaims, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics, Inc., No. 2:13-00640 (D. Utah 
June 6, 2014), ECF No. 194; Transcript of Motion Hearing June 6, 2014 at 21−46, 59−60, Univ. of Utah 
Research Found., No 2:13-00640, ECF No. 197. 
254 See Sam Kean, The Human Genome (Patent) Project, 331 SCI. 530, 530 (2011). See also CITE. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 See, e.g., In Re BRCA1 and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., MDL Case No. 2:14-
MD-2510 (D. Utah July 7, 2014). Of course, pushing up against Myriad’s enforcement strategy with 
respect to its remaining claims is Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012), which effectively eliminates many of the method claims being used by Myriad and other diagnostic 
companies to keep competitors at bay. 
258 In Re BRCA1 and BRCA2-Based Breast Cancer Test Patent Litig., MDL No. 2:14-2510 (D. Utah July 
7, 2014). For a discussion of Myriad’s current litigation in a bigger context of its post-patent-expiration 
legal and business strategies, see John M. Conley et al., Myriad after Myriad: The Proprietary Data 
Dilemma, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 597 (2014). 
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interest in preserving patent rights will not always trump other considerations, especially 726	  
when public health issues are at stake.”259 727	  
As with the gene code itself, the impact of gene patents in the marketplace and the 728	  
public may be too complex to understand without more rigorous empirical work. In the 729	  
Myriad case, despite equivocality of evidence, the potential harms stemming from patent 730	  
owner conduct (such as exclusive licensing and excess prices) remained salient to 731	  
researchers, clinicians, and patient groups from patenting onward. Yet, due to the 732	  
USPTO’s early choice to patent isolated sequence claims and subsequent sub silentio 733	  
acceptance by courts, these potential harms were relegated to a sideshow where scientists 734	  
pushed for policy without capturing the attention of lawmakers in any meaningful way.261 735	  
Even after Myriad, important issues remain for companies that own patents on 736	  
other biotechnology inventions now in a state of flux. For example, patents claiming 737	  
human stem cells have been challenged at the USPTO through a reexamination, but the 738	  
group asserting invalidity could not establish standing to appeal the final decision,262 nor 739	  
presumably to bring a declaratory judgment action the way that the ACLU did in Myriad. 740	  
As these new cases arise, it would be wise to consider that patent law need not remain 741	  
stagnant as the technological frontier moves forward. Part III addresses the meaning of 742	  
Myriad through this lens. 743	  
III. FROM MYRIAD ONWARD 744	  
The Myriad case continues to draw attention because it is not just about simply 745	  
parsing the patent eligibility doctrine within a lawsuit. Rather, the case demonstrates how 746	  
patent law principles in operation create tangible and long-lasting impacts when the 747	  
stability of the law pushes against the progress of technology. From the very beginning, 748	  
Myriad was a lightning rod amidst the growing controversy over patenting genes and 749	  
biotechnology in general.264 As research progressed in this area, the safety concerns 750	  
highlighted in Chakrabarty gave way to abstract concerns about the commercialization of 751	  
genes in general.267 Myriad was a single patent owner among thousands who received 752	  
patents claiming significant gene sequences, yet its monopoly over breast cancer 753	  
diagnostic testing placed the company within the sights of two public interest groups—754	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 In Re BRCA1 and BRCA2-Based Breast Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1257 (D. Utah 
2014). See Karuna Jaggar, Breast Cancer Genes and Patient Protection in an Era of Personalized 
Medicine, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2014, 11:56 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karuna-
jaggar/breast-cancer-genetic-testing_b_4995183.html. 
261 See Kane, supra note 244, at 853 (describing efforts to establish a research exemption for the use of 
diagnostic gene patents). 
262 See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (2014).  
264 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Move To Patent Cancer Gene Is Called Obstacle to Research, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 1996, at A14. 
267 The Court in Chakrabarty referenced “a gruesome parade of horribles” presented by the amicus briefs—
the concerns “that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human race, . . . [that it] may spread 
pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to 
depreciate the value of human life.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980). The Court goes on 
to quote Hamlet, “It is sometimes better ‘to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.’” 
Id. The Court brushed aside these fears as non-patent, “high policy” matters best left to Congress, but 
activists continued to push for a ban on gene patents altogether. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Rights to 
Life: Are Scientists Wrong to Patent Genes?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 1995, at 120 (reviewing two 
books on gene patenting and approving generally of Chakrabarty and the patenting of BRCA genes). 
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those who advocated against gene patenting and those who advocated on behalf of 755	  
women’s health.269 This convergence of two impassioned causes arguably provided the 756	  
impetus for the Myriad litigation to resolve important legal questions about whether and 757	  
to what extent genomic sequences (and perhaps other biotechnologies) are patent eligible. 758	  
Part III explores the meaning of Myriad with this backdrop and offers some suggestions 759	  
for mitigating the mistake of promoting stability over legal growth. 760	  
Myriad went to a great deal of expense to discover a product that straddled the 761	  
boundary of Section 101 by being both created by man and found in nature. Before this 762	  
discovery, the USPTO declared that it would treat products like this as patent eligible 763	  
based upon analogies to related technologies. Myriad applied for and obtained patents 764	  
over its discovery, presumably incentivized to make this and other discoveries by the 765	  
ability to obtain them. Once they issued, Myriad prevented competitors from using the 766	  
genes commercially, which created a profitable (and completely legal) monopoly for 767	  
Myriad.270 Although the patents are now mostly invalidated, Myriad should lead the 768	  
market in question for some time to come because of the long time between obtaining 769	  
patent protection and the litigation (which enabled Myriad to assume a dominant market 770	  
position) and because diagnostic testing necessarily involves information transfer from 771	  
patients (which enabled Myriad to assemble a large amount of proprietary information).  772	  
As a patent law story alone, Myriad is not remarkable. In addition to providing 773	  
private value to Myriad, the patenting of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences generated 774	  
both positive and negative externalities on third parties, as often happens with patenting 775	  
in general. And as often happens with patenting in general, these externalities 776	  
compounded over the patent term. The Supreme Court later invalidated the patent claims 777	  
that were most valuable to Myriad, but not for almost twenty years from the earliest filing 778	  
dates (a length of time roughly equal to the patent term itself).271 The patent eligibility 779	  
model of Chakrabarty initially predicted an outcome of patent eligibility for isolated 780	  
sequences, and the USPTO utilized that prediction to develop examination guidelines and 781	  
policies within the agency.272 That initial prediction, it turned out, was incorrect—upon 782	  
close scrutiny by the Myriad Court, the isolated sequences are not patent eligible after 783	  
all.273 The same rules are in place (the 150 year old model of O’Reilly and Le Roy, carried 784	  
forward in Chakrabarty and Myriad), except isolated gene sequences are better 785	  
characterized as naturally-occurring information instead of man-made molecules—a 786	  
change that reflects the dynamic nature of knowledge, science, and technology,274 not a 787	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 For a study of how activists over come barriers to break into technology policymaking that features both 
gene patent critics and breast cancer advocates, see Parthasarathy, supra note 97.  
270 See Conley, supra note 258, at 612 (describing how Myriad derived an extensive proprietary database of 
patient information from its long-term monopoly involving over one million patients). 
271 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
272 See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 148. The USPTO issued new examination guidelines to 
reflect recent caselaw, including Myriad. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Guidance For Determining 
Subject Matter Eligibility Of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural 
Products (2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo-guidance.pdf. 
273 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). 
274 Professors Helen Berman and Rochelle Dreyfuss persuasively suggest that Chakrabarty’s eligibility 
doctrine must make a more realistic appraisal of underlying science to support patents further downstream 
and at the same time preserve incentives to drug developers. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. 
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more enlightened or robust version of patent law eligibility. In this simple version of 788	  
Myriad, patent law works for its intended purpose—it incentivized Myriad (and many 789	  
others) to invest significantly in research and development in reliance on the potential for 790	  
obtaining patent rights over the discoveries.276  791	  
But Myriad is not just a simple patent law story A growing cadre of detractors 792	  
kept Myriad and other diagnostic testing companies under fire after the patents issued.277 793	  
Gene patent critics maintained the ethical controversy surrounding privatization of 794	  
genes.278 Physicians worried that Myriad’s monopoly interfered with healthcare decisions 795	  
made by and on behalf of patients.279 Concerns applicable to any patented good or 796	  
service—restrictions on access, supracompetitive prices, and reduced innovation—looked 797	  
more problematic when applied to Myriad. Opponents claimed that gene patents allowed 798	  
Myriad to restrict patient access to necessary medical care and to maintain a 799	  
supracompetitive price for its diagnostic tests,280 that consumers were limited to only the 800	  
tests provided by Myriad even though alternative tests and providers might be available, 801	  
and that consolidating testing to one or a few laboratories could slow progress being 802	  
made to understand the disease itself.281 Myriad countered these concerns by arguing that 803	  
gene patents did not slow innovation, that start-up companies like Myriad relied on patent 804	  
incentives to disclose their inventions and to commercialize them based upon the ability 805	  
to exclude others from practicing their claimed inventions, and that its “single-source 806	  
model” had “faster turnaround times for results . . . a significantly lower rate of uncertain 807	  
test results in the U.S.,”282 and pricing consistent with a competitive market.283  808	  
A polarized debate is nothing new when it comes to patent law—factions have 809	  
long argued over whether broad rights are required to provide enough incentive to 810	  
innovate or whether narrower rights are preferred to encourage follow-on 811	  
improvements.284 Patents carry exclusive rights that can be very valuable to their owners. 812	  
However, despite a presumption of validity, patents can be (and often are) challenged 813	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 871 (2006). 
276 Eisenberg, Gene Patenting Controversy, supra note 147, at 1383.  
277 Two other diagnostic companies have been singled out as contributing to the reduced innovation and 
access concerns raised by gene patents. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., by virtue of large numbers of exclusively 
licensed patents, became “the sole provider of genetic testing for many neurological and endocrine 
conditions (including muscular dystrophies, Alzheimer’s disease, hereditary deafness, spinocerebellar 
ataxia, and other conditions).” Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and 
Human Genetics, 11 ANN. REV. OF GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383, 412 (2010). PGxHealth, Inc. 
likewise, used gene patents to become the sole provider of diagnostic testing associated with Long-QT 
Syndrome. Id. Another entrant subsequently broke PGxHealth’s monopoly with patents over variant 
sequences. Id. [CITE]  
278 Eisenberg, Gene Patenting Controversy, supra note 147, at 1381. See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent 
Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH. L. & POL’Y 65 (2002).  
279 Eisenberg, Gene Patenting Controversy, supra note 147, at 1382−83; [CITE] 
280 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 240, at S18. 
281 Eisenberg, Gene Patenting Controversy, supra note 147, at 1383.  
282 MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., supra note 234, at 23. 
283 Id. at 23−24. 
284 For example, O’Reilly v. Morse can be considered an early example of that basic debate when 
comparing Justice Taney’s majority opinion (favoring narrower rights) to Justice Grier’s dissenting opinion 
(favoring broader rights for pioneering inventions). [Adam Mossoff’s new paper.] 
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regularly in courts by private litigants and in USPTO reviews filed by third parties or the 814	  
patent owners themselves. What makes Myriad a case for reflection is not that the 815	  
Supreme Court corrected an earlier interpretation of Section 101—courts contour patent 816	  
doctrines all of the time in ways that leave winners and losers.285 Rather, Myriad reminds 817	  
us that patent law’s inherent affinity for stability can and will be challenged by outside 818	  
pressures to grow and adapt. The question becomes how best to manage smart adaptation 819	  
without unraveling the important incentives connected to patents—in other words, how to 820	  
manage the tension between stability and progress. The remainder of this Part presents 821	  
three general insights to improve the dialogue within patent law about this important (and 822	  
eternal) tension: 1) patent law is not certain; 2) procedural rules can, and do, have 823	  
substantive impact; and 3) promoting progress in technology may mean more than simply 824	  
incentivizing actors to invent. Each is addressed in turn. 825	  
A. Patent Law is Not Certain 826	  
Myriad introduces an important lesson: patent law is not certain. As Cardozo 827	  
reminded his early twentieth century audience, the law is not a quest for absolute 828	  
certainty, but a way to predict an outcome in the next case to come along.286 It’s easy to 829	  
read Myriad and come to the conclusion that isolated genomic sequences are not patent 830	  
eligible subject matter and never have been—that the USPTO was simply wrong in its 831	  
characterization for so many years, as was the Federal Circuit in Myriad.287 In reality, the 832	  
USPTO and courts make decisions on the patentability of individual claims in individual 833	  
patents based on all of the information that they have at that time, but scientists are 834	  
constantly working to learn more.  835	  
In the early 1980s, the USPTO allowed claims drawn to new and useful isolated 836	  
genomic sequences by fitting them to its older chemical composition case law. Using this 837	  
analogy, the post-Chakrabarty patent eligibility model predicted patent eligibility 838	  
because isolated sequences are different chemical compounds from the sequences found 839	  
inside human cells. 288  Few doubted this policy as sound legal reasoning from 840	  
Chakrabarty, even though some believed that unmodified genetic sequences should not 841	  
be patentable at all, that such sequences were better characterized as information, or that 842	  
Chakrabarty should be adapted to a more realistic understanding of the underlying 843	  
science.289 Years later, explaining that unaltered isolated sequences (as compared to 844	  
cDNA sequences) are more informational than chemical, the Myriad Court emphasized 845	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (invalidating patent claims on obviousness 
grounds); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (eliminating automatic injunctions for 
patent owners who succeed on an infringement claim); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 
(2014) (invalidating patent claims on eligibility grounds). 
286 CARDOZO, supra note 6. 
287 Debra J. H. Mathews, et al., Patents and Misplaced Angst: Lessons for Translational Stem Cell 
Research from Genomics, 12 CELL STEM CELL 508, 509 (May 2, 2013) (“It will indeed be a deep irony for 
genomics . . . if, just as key patents near expiration, the Supreme Court rules that the broadest patent claims 
enforced for over a decade should never have been granted.”). 
288 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 148, at 1093. 
289 Berman & Dreyfuss, supra note 274, at 871, 882. 
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its adherence to the old eligibility model to find these same inventions patent 846	  
ineligible.290  847	  
Myriad highlights the Court’s attempts over the years to preserve a stable 848	  
doctrine—a wide and expansive in scope despite limited, implicit exceptions to preclude 849	  
products of nature, abstract ideas, and natural laws. This model forces courts to draw a 850	  
line between man-made inventions and naturally occurring discoveries, which should 851	  
involve a carefully considered weighing of the benefits and harms of granting exclusive 852	  
rights. Indeed, as the Court stated in Myriad, “[P]atent [law] strikes a delicate balance 853	  
between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and 854	  
‘impeding the flow of information that might permit, indeed, spur invention.’”291 Despite 855	  
recognizing the “uneasy compromises”292 that should be made in drawing such fine lines, 856	  
the Court chose to focus its short inquiry on whether the claims at issue were created by 857	  
man. For example, denying patent eligibility to the isolated gene sequences, the Court 858	  
stated that “Myriad did not create or alter either the genetic information encoded in the 859	  
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes or the genetic structure of the DNA,” and that Myriad’s 860	  
patents did not “depend[] upon the creation of a unique molecule.”293 In contrast, the 861	  
Court describes cDNA sequences as “not naturally occurring” because “the lab technician 862	  
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.”294 This narrow distinction 863	  
may be less useful in future cases because courts addressing new and complex 864	  
technologies will still use the same standard for products, asking whether the claimed 865	  
invention is a composition of matter, manufacture, or machine, and if so, whether the 866	  
product is naturally occurring. Whether a product is not naturally occurring carries the 867	  
same meaning that it did in 1980 and long before that—is it made by man? 868	  
The Myriad story reminds us that developing a stable rule to predict the patent 869	  
eligibility of future technologies is difficult. The Myriad Court, like other courts before it, 870	  
approaches this difficulty by examining the new technology under the old rule. The 871	  
advantage to this approach is that it maintains stability in the rule itself to comfort 872	  
stakeholders at all levels of investment in inventing and commercialization. The 873	  
disadvantage is the worst case scenario illustrated by Myriad—an initial judgment call to 874	  
grant exclusive rights granted for some time and in great numbers followed by a decision 875	  
that reverses this course and renders the issued patents (and others in the same category) 876	  
invalid. Patent stakeholders must accept the costs of overprotection in the interim as part 877	  
and parcel of patent law. Despite vocal critics, Myriad’s business model enforcing its 878	  
patents to the full extent of the law apparently did not influence the underlying eligibility 879	  
questions. Myriad enforced its valid patent claims to protect its own business, until they 880	  
were not valid anymore.   881	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118, 2119 (2013). This is 
true, at least, for the inventions as claimed by Myriad in its patents. 
291 Id. at 2116. 
292 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 173, at 49.  
293 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. 
294 Id. at 2119.  
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A different approach to shoehorning new technology into old law might be to 882	  
embrace a paradigm shift within the doctrine of patent eligibility. 295 Thomas Kuhn 883	  
famously introduced the concept of paradigm shifts in the science world in his seminal 884	  
1962 work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.296 In the legal world, Cardozo hinted 885	  
at the same concept when he talked about growth in the law.297 Building upon these 886	  
concepts, individual rules of law might best be described as hypotheses that predict future 887	  
interests. These hypotheses can be reworked as courts and scientists learn more, not just 888	  
with respect to deductively reasoning forward from cases (as shown in the patent 889	  
eligibility cases, including Myriad), but also with respect to history, custom, and social 890	  
science.298 Prediction plays a large role in our modern legal system. 300 The legal system 891	  
in general, and patent law in particular, craves rules with black and white answers.302 Yet, 892	  
as principles or precedent grow, the goal should not be to establish certainty but to 893	  
establish probabilities. At some point, the probabilities might suggest the old principle 894	  
should give way to a new one. In this manner, the rule of law develops as a scientific 895	  
theory might, and thus could experience similar major shifts in doctrine.303 896	  
Patent law encourages doctrinal uniformity and predictability because the quid 897	  
pro quo developed for granting patents in the first place relies on ex ante investment in 898	  
research, invention, and commercialization. In that light, stability in patent law is a great 899	  
thing (as it is in other areas of the law). Yet, paradigm shifts can be warranted. The 900	  
Myriad opinion is narrowly confined to its reading of Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. 901	  
The Court says quite a bit about genetic sequences, but it does not say that much about 902	  
patent eligibility that has not been said time and time again in cases that force courts to 903	  
consider new technology in light of old laws.304 Under that rubric, cDNA survives Justice 904	  
Thomas’ opinion as patent eligible. Perhaps patent owners and others should not be so 905	  
quick to take these determinations as unchanging. New information will come to light. 906	  
That the law is wide open yet bounded does not mean that the boundaries need to be 907	  
fixed absolutely, they just need to be fixed relative to this day and age. As Cardozo 908	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 This is not a novel idea. See Bermand & Dreyfuss, supra note 274, at 873 (suggesting that the default 
rule of Chakrabarty should be replaced with a more organic version to reflect advancing scientific 
discoveries). 
296 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (3d. ed. 1996). 
297 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 62.  
298 Id. 
300 Id. at 37−38. “When the uniformities of antecedents and consequents are sufficiently constant to be the 
subject of prediction with reasonable certainty, we say that law exists.” Cardozo refers to Dr. John C. H. 
Wu’s article on Justice Holmes, Juristic Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, as closely related to his own 
thoughts on this topic. Id. at 44−46. In Wu’s article, Holmes is quoted as saying, “The prophecies of what 
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” John C. H. Wu, The 
Juristic Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 21 MICH. L. R. 523, 530 (1923). Cardozo summarizes Wu’s 
argument as one regarding the law as “concern[ing] primarily our future interest.” CARDOZO, supra note 6, 
at 45. 
302 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 67−68. Continuing a theme from earlier in this work, Cardozo refers to “the 
pain of marking off such zones from others” as the pain of choosing a method for making decisions even 
within such formal systems, necessary for the law to grow. Id. at 68. 
303 See KUHN, supra note 287 (introducing a descriptive account of how paradigm shifts occur in scientific 
theories). 
304 See e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127 (1948). 
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wrote, “The good of one generation is not always the good of its successor.”305 Courts 909	  
will continue to consider whether Section 101 should be confined meaningfully by the 910	  
implicit exceptions or whether it should be a low threshold that courts should not bother 911	  
to gatekeep.306 While they do so, technology will continue to move forward. Patent law, 912	  
like other areas of the law, has the capacity to grow and reverse course. What makes 913	  
Myriad both important and inevitable is that the issues raised in the litigation about patent 914	  
eligibility (and the resulting consequences of overprotection in the meantime) expose 915	  
patent law as particularly susceptible to doctrinal entrenchment. The long delay from the 916	  
patents issuing to their invalidation had important consequences, including the potential 917	  
for reduced innovation, limited access to important inventions, and a protected market 918	  
share for Myriad. Additionally, the Myriad Court introduced no major legal innovations 919	  
to the patent eligibility doctrine suggesting that this will not happen again. Myriad, above 920	  
all, cautions that no law should be a dead letter. 921	  
B. Procedural Rules Can Have Substantive Impact  922	  
As described above, the plaintiffs in Myriad faced an uphill battle to establish 923	  
standing to bring suit, despite many allegations of harm from Myriad’s business practices 924	  
and from gene patents themselves. Under the Federal Circuit’s pre-MedImmune case law, 925	  
a declaratory plaintiff seeking to challenge a patent had to establish a reasonable 926	  
apprehension of suit, 307  something none of the plaintiffs realistically could have 927	  
proven.308 Researchers and others who believed that gene patents in general, and patents 928	  
claiming isolated BRCA sequences in particular, harmed patients and the public had to be 929	  
content to criticize the policies in journal articles, popular press, and USPTO hearings on 930	  
related topics. The post-MedImmune liberalized approach to determining whether a case 931	  
is sufficiently real and immediate to warrant federal adjudication enabled one plaintiff to 932	  
establish the required interest in the case to keep it alive in federal court. One plaintiff is 933	  
all it takes to challenge a patent. Arguably, the ACLU or another interest group could 934	  
have brought suit ten years prior or in the interim, if enough facts existed to establish a 935	  
reasonable apprehension of suit from Myriad, but it is equally likely that the rigorous 936	  
standing requirement prior to 2007 prevented any meaningful challenge by plaintiffs 937	  
similarly situated to the ones in Myriad.  938	  
The same could be said for challenges brought through agency proceedings, 939	  
where any USPTO policy will be difficult to challenge within the agency itself (although 940	  
not impossible). These procedures, even after recent revisions, are limited in scope and 941	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 84. 
306 Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader described subject matter eligibility as “merely a 
threshold check,” and stated, “[T]he categories of patent eligible subject matter are no more than a ‘coarse 
eligibility filter.’” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2013) (quoting Research Corp. 
Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (2010)). See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 
659 F.3d 1057 (describing Section 101 as governing the threshold of entry into the patent system for further 
consideration,). In a concurrence in Classen, joined by Judge Newman, Judge Rader boldly states, “This 
court should decline to accept invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.” Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 
(Rader, J., concurring). . 
307 See Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d 1376. 
308 Myriad’s cease-and-desist letters were over ten years old by the time they filed suit. See Sierra Applied 
Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding no 
jurisdiction when the parties didn’t communicate for four years).  
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time, and carry a steep estoppel provision, making them less desirable for groups like the 942	  
ACLU to use to challenge individual patents to promote a broad policy agenda the way 943	  
that the plaintiffs did in the Myriad litigation.  944	  
After almost thirty years of similar patents issuing from the USPTO to others, 945	  
Myriad held that isolated gene sequences are free for everyone to use and not patent 946	  
eligible, furthering an important public policy “favoring the full and free use of ideas in 947	  
the public domain.”310 Policymakers would be wise to consider how the limited ability to 948	  
challenge the USPTO’s policies and the individual patents on Section 101 grounds 949	  
impacted the development of substantive law in this area through delay.311  950	  
This aspect of Myriad illustrates how marginal growth within one doctrine (like 951	  
standing to sue in declaratory patent cases) can promote a general policy within the patent 952	  
laws overall. The Supreme Court in Lear and again in MedImmune emphasized the 953	  
importance of encouraging the invalidation of bad patents.312 That policy seemingly 954	  
guided Judge Sweet to find standing, despite precedent within the Federal Circuit that 955	  
might have predicted the Myriad plaintiffs could not sue even after MedImmune (or at 956	  
least predicted a close question).313 This policy also seemingly guided the Federal Circuit 957	  
to affirm standing on the narrowest of margins in Ostrer’s ability to infringe. Although 958	  
the Federal Circuit’s opinion considerably carved down the reach of the lower court’s 959	  
standing decision to just one single plaintiff with sufficient standing to sue, one plaintiff 960	  
is all it takes to maintain the suit. In an age of patent skepticism, this is not insignificant 961	  
progress within the law.  962	  
C.  Promote Progress Means More Than Incentivize  963	  
The Myriad story also suggests that the traditionally stated goal of patent law to 964	  
incentivize innovation (or disclosure or commercialization) is just one in a spectrum of 965	  
goals that arise from the constitutional mandate to promote progress. Of the many 966	  
theories that have been developed to justify a patent system like the one in the United 967	  
States, the utilitarian rationale carries the most sway.314 This rationale suggests that 968	  
invention, commercialization, and disclosure of new and useful inventions maximize the 969	  
general welfare of all of us. Thus, to encourage such invention, commercialization, and 970	  
disclosure of their inventions, the government grants to private actors exclusive rights. 971	  
Exclusive rights can be valuable, and as such, individuals and firms often seek them to 972	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969). In Actavis, the Court favored antitrust scrutiny of a 
reverse payment settlement scheme between a generic company and a patent owner pharmaceutical. FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
311 The USPTO could be challenged in litigation for its policymaking. Myriad involved a claim against the 
USPTO for improperly issuing all gene patents as a violation of the constitutional mandate to promote 
progress, but those claims were dismissed because the district court invalidated all of the claims on Section 
101 grounds. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
Thus, the USPTO’s power to grant patents to gene sequences was not an issue in either the Federal Circuit 
or the Supreme Court. Moreover, historically, courts have been reticent to litigate claims against the 
USPTO for granting patents erroneously. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (concluding that plaintiff animal rights group lacked standing to sue the USPTO). 
312 Lear, 395 U.S. at 673–74. 
313 See Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). [CITE]  
314 [CITE] 
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improve profitability in research and development.315 When patents are sought, we are all 973	  
better off, so the story goes. Descriptively, the rationale goes a long way—inventors seek 974	  
patents, and one reason they do so is the potential for supracompetitive profits or some 975	  
other return on investment as a result of a patent’s limited but exclusive rights.316 Patents 976	  
also provide public benefits, including increased innovation, commercialization, and 977	  
disclosure of information to the public.317 To provide these benefits, the patent system 978	  
carries large costs: administrative costs at the USPTO, 318 the potential for deadweight 979	  
loss in the form of output restriction by patent owners, and the potential for patent races 980	  
between rivals, resulting in considerable expenditures prior to obtaining patent protection, 981	  
both important societal costs. 319 When the patentability requirements, including Section 982	  
101, are met, the patent balance sheet assumes that the benefits are greater than the costs, 983	  
and thus technological progress is promoted.320  984	  
Even the most vocal critics of gene patents (and of Myriad’s business model that 985	  
exploited them) remained on the legal sidelines. Why? Courts typically equate a patent’s 986	  
exclusive rights with the desirable “encouragement of investment-based risk.”321 This 987	  
incentive-centric approach to patent law characterizes licensing and exploitation, and by 988	  
extension the right to exclude others, as necessary to achieve the constitutional goal of 989	  
promoting progress in implementing a patent system.322 Accordingly, the U.S. patent 990	  
system accepts limited access to patented good or services and higher prices as standard 991	  
harms that might arise from patenting—claims about access and prices are important, to 992	  
be sure, but they are also worries that courts prefer to leave for Congress to handle.323 993	  
Patents are explicitly exclusive—the consequences of exclusivity that fall short of 994	  
antitrust violations or patent misuse are accepted as a matter of course.324 Perhaps the 995	  
ACLU’s pessimistic view of its chance of success in Myriad was driven, in part, by its 996	  
recognition that concerns about Myriad’s business model might not be persuasive enough 997	  
to move the needle on a stable doctrine like patent eligibility.  998	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 [CITE] 
316 [CITE, maybe Berkeley entrepreneurial study] 
317 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 216 (2008). 
318 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006). 
319 On the some of the costs of output restriction, see T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of 
Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 240 (2009) (examining some of 
the deadweight losses that result from granting substandard patents). On the costs of races to invent, see 
Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968) (modeling competition 
among firms for patent rights as inefficient races to invent that dissipate social surplus). 
320 Over time, technology has progressed—from the cotton gin, to the telegraph, to the light bulb, to the 
airplane, to the smart phone—and that could be directly caused by the patent system. Or, it could be caused 
by the passage of time, scientific advancements, and other factors. That question—not whether technology 
has progressed, but how much has it progressed as a result of the patent system—may be unanswerable. 
[CITE] 
321 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599−600 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith Int’l, Inc. v. 
Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577−78 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983)). 
322 Id. 
323 See [CITE]. 
324 For a discussion of antitrust violations in the context of patent owner conduct, see Nobelpharma AB v. 
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For an explanation of the patent misuse defense, 
see Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see generally Mark A. Lemley, 
The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990). 
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The Myriad story could start an entirely new conversation—not about gene 999	  
patents, but about whether patent law should take into account a wider group of values 1000	  
that inform both patent eligibility and the scope of a patent’s rights.326 A multi-valence 1001	  
approach to patent law could improve upon an incentive-centric one by allowing courts 1002	  
and policymakers (including Congress and the USPTO) to consider other factors that 1003	  
promote progress outside of the traditional utilitarian rationale, including traditional 1004	  
notions of fairness, equity, and economic concerns like access and price. 1005	  
Myriad was a rich Section 101 case with many competing values bound to the 1006	  
question of whether Myriad deserved exclusive rights associated with the isolated gene 1007	  
sequences claimed in its patents. At the oral arguments, the justices questioned the parties 1008	  
about the impact of its ruling on incentives for biotechnology companies and inventors.327 1009	  
The question on everyone’s mind appears to be: if patent protection is weakened in some 1010	  
way by a ruling, what is the impact on the patent system’s ability to incentivize? In his 1011	  
dissent of the Court’s denial of certiorari in Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, 1012	  
Justice Breyer explains, “Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as 1013	  
surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that too little protection can 1014	  
threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and risky 1015	  
shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery within the 1016	  
scope of patentability while excluding others.”328 In other words, Section 101 helps the 1017	  
progress promotion balance sheet stay in the black, the traditional goal of patent law.  1018	  
When it considered the eligibility question, the Myriad Court purportedly 1019	  
weighed the important incentives awarded by isolated gene patents, especially in 1020	  
fledgling industries like biotechnology, against the preemption of others’ uses of these 1021	  
genes for society’s benefit.329 In other Section 101 cases, the Court similarly focuses on 1022	  
incentives versus preemption (which presumably provides incentives for future inventors 1023	  
by preserving the use of products of nature, abstract ideas, or natural laws for all). The 1024	  
Court does not consider other values like access, affordable prices, or even the “gruesome 1025	  
parade of horribles” raised in Chakrabarty.330 Incentivizing invention (and the resultant 1026	  
commercialization of technologies valuable to society) appears to be the only goal 1027	  
considered when tinkering with patent law doctrines, including eligibility. The promotion 1028	  
of progress has been distilled to this goal alone. Section 101, the most abstract of the 1029	  
patentability requirements, allows for a more robust policy discussion than the other 1030	  
patentability statutes, including Section 102’s novelty, Section 103’s non-obviousness, 1031	  
and Section 112’s disclosure requirements, and still, the Supreme Court has not indicated 1032	  
any interest in its Section 101 cases, including Myriad, to consider the effort expended 1033	  
for discovery, nor the effect on access or pricing.331 This is not to suggest that a multi-1034	  
valence analysis should always render the patent not eligible for patenting. On the 1035	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 See Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of 
“Progress”?, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1197 (2013). Rose argues that the Supreme 
Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence, in particular, fails to recognize “equally important measures of 
progress” like improved public health and access to basic research tools. Id. at 1198. 
327 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 173, at 11, 12, 52, 58. 
328 Lab Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
329 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).  
330 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980). 
331 The Myriad Court makes this clear.  
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contrary, it would simply invite a more robust conversation about patenting and the 1036	  
impact of exclusivity on patent owners and the public. As Malcolm Gladwell said of 1037	  
Myriad in 1995, “If you can get a patent for building a better mousetrap, it is very hard to 1038	  
argue that you don’t deserve a patent for decoding the mysteries of breast cancer.”332 1039	  
Careful consideration in some industries might indicate rewarding discovery does create 1040	  
more benefits to society as a whole than the avoidance of preemption.  1041	  
Myriad represents one kind of overprotection, where a field of invention obtains 1042	  
patents that are later invalidated as a category not eligible for patenting under Section 1043	  
101. Overprotection also might occur when the USPTO makes a simple mistake in 1044	  
examination, or when a court interprets a rule of patentability narrowly compared to an 1045	  
earlier broad interpretation. Myriad concerns itself with correcting overprotection by 1046	  
characterizing the patenting of isolated gene sequences as an error under its Chakrabarty 1047	  
doctrine. As Part III.A explains, however, maybe this was not in error, but a second best 1048	  
decision made with the knowledge available at the time and later replaced with another 1049	  
second best decision based on new knowledge about genes and how they work. Myriad 1050	  
does not seem to acknowledge that overprotection (and underprotection) are relative 1051	  
concepts tied to the laws for obtaining patent protection. The costs of overprotection—1052	  
those costs the patent system purports to account for in balance with the private and 1053	  
public benefits provided by the patent—are borne by society, and accepted lock, stock, 1054	  
and barrel, once the decision to grant the patent has been made. What made Myriad such 1055	  
a polarizing case is that not only did it involve an allegation of traditional patent harms 1056	  
stemming from a single-provider monopoly, 335  but an allegation that the patents 1057	  
interfered with patients’ medical care decisions and treatment.336 From the time that its 1058	  
patents were granted, Myriad enforced them against others when it needed to, and used 1059	  
them defensively to deter entrants to its diagnostic testing market. Myriad also looked the 1060	  
other way when researchers used the sequences, worked to expand insurance coverage of 1061	  
its test so that more people could afford it, and used feedback from patients and others to 1062	  
improve the quality of its tests. Invalidation rendered Myriad’s isolated gene sequence 1063	  
claims invalid, as well as all other claims drawn to isolated gene sequences (and other 1064	  
claims that might fall within the product of nature exception explained in Myriad), but it 1065	  
did not undo any of the gains made by Myriad or other patent owners in the interim that 1066	  
resulted from exclusivity guaranteed by the patents. Myriad represents one example of 1067	  
how overprotection not only results in exclusivity where there should be none, but 1068	  
exclusivity that endures even once the overprotection is corrected. 1069	  
Accordingly, in addition to considering additional values when making a decision 1070	  
on eligibility (whether a patent should be granted in the first place), the Myriad case 1071	  
might also hint that the patent’s strong property right to exclude others could be adapted 1072	  
to mitigate the possibility of overprotection in the first instance. Currently, patent law 1073	  
does not police patent owner conduct other than in the limited defense of patent misuse 1074	  
for infringement defendants. Antitrust law does some policing, but most patent owner 1075	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Gladwell, supra note 266, at 122. 
 335 [CITE suggests that Myriad’s pricing structure eliminated one typical monopoly harm, the deadweight 
loss.]  
336 Kane, supra note 244, at 835, 851−52.  
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conduct is immune from antitrust liability.337 If some policing of conduct were to occur 1076	  
that takes into account the importance of preserving the incentive to innovate as well as 1077	  
other values important to the public interest, the decision to grant a patent in the first 1078	  
place could result in fewer harms like those identified in Myriad as problematic over 1079	  
time, regardless of later invalidation. 1080	  
IV. CONCLUSION 1081	  
Maybe the most important lesson that can be learned from cases like Myriad 1082	  
(ones in which the legal problems are complex) is a subtle one: the big picture is 1083	  
complicated. After all, if every case were easy to resolve on the merits, all lawyers and 1084	  
judges would be out of jobs quickly. Technology is complex, also. This results in a 1085	  
tendency (maybe even a compulsion) among patent attorneys and courts deciding patent 1086	  
cases to analogize to other areas of the law, to shoehorn fact into narrow doctrines, or 1087	  
otherwise to do things that reduce the case and the technology at issue into smaller and 1088	  
smaller, easy to digest components. This method of tackling complexity merits 1089	  
commendation—it has been described as an evolutionary cognitive process.338 However, 1090	  
over time, within legal doctrines, simplification that aids in categorizing and predicting 1091	  
outcomes for future cases may result in an unintended consequence that resonates in 1092	  
patent law—too much stability. Policymakers might fail to appreciate that complexity in 1093	  
a case could bring richness and nuance to our understanding of doctrines, especially those 1094	  
built upon complexity like patent law.  1095	  
Patents had been granted on genes for twenty-five years and this enabled policy 1096	  
makers to review the consequences of gene patents over that long period of time when 1097	  
considering the eligibility question in Myriad. Collecting data is good—it provides for a 1098	  
richer view of the incentives rationale and perhaps supports different rationales for 1099	  
protecting patents in the first place—but what about the intervening twenty-five years of 1100	  
enforcement actions, license agreements, and unquestioning adherence to the patent 1101	  
eligibility model set forth in Chakrabarty? The incentive story that supports the 1102	  
Chakrabarty model of Section 101 dominates how courts view questions of eligibility 1103	  
and enforcement, and this causes courts to ignore other values, including both positive 1104	  
and negative externalities resulting from the issuance of patents. Because these 1105	  
externalities implicate not just technological progress but overall societal welfare, courts 1106	  
should be cautious in reducing eligibility and enforcement questions to logical deductions 1107	  
revolving around ex ante incentives to inventors. Instead, courts should embrace the 1108	  
possibility of progress within and across doctrines to move patent law toward an ultimate 1109	  
goal like welfare maximization, inestimable (and invaluable) as it may be. Stable 1110	  
doctrines and entrenched status quos provide a safe avenue for courts and certainly avoid 1111	  
messy departures into analyses with no absolute truths. Perhaps the lasting legacy of 1112	  
Myriad is that growth within the law is possible, but multi-valence scrutiny may be 1113	  
necessary to promote that kind of progress. 1114	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
338 [Tversky? Judgment under Uncertainty?] 
